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This paper is about discrimination in the legal profession, and about the
kinds of responses to discrimination that the legal profession should be
considering. I begin with a review of the various forms of discrimination
which exist in the legal profession. Discrimination in the legal profession
ranges from the exclusion of the members of certain groups from parts of
the profession, to sexual harassment, to discrimination in our courts, to
the exclusion and deprecation of the perspectives and experiences of
those who have not traditionally beenin positions of power. Discrimination
in the legal profession occurs against women, against aboriginal people,
against ethnic groups, against homosexuals, and against other groups as
well.
Because of the privileged position of the legal profession in Canadian
society, the members of the profession have a responsibility to set an
example in the way that they govern and regulate their professional affairs.
Strategies for the elimination of discrimination in the legal profession must
operate on a number of fronts at once. Education of lawyers and judges
about discrimination is very important, as are steps to make the legal
profession more diverse. It is my argument that the recognition of a
professional duty of non-discrimination is just as important.
1. LL.M. candidate, Harvard Law School. Preparation of this paper for publication was made
possible by a J.S.D. Tory Writing Award. My thanks to Brent Cotter and Diane MacDonald
for their helpful comments.
Codes of Professional Conduct and the Duty of Non-Discrimination
The idea of a professional duty of non-discrimination is new in Canada,
but it has assumed growing force in the U.S. To provide a context in which
to assess a duty of non-discrimination, Iwill review the American experience
with the duty of non-discrimination. Many U.S.jurisdictions have interpreted
general duties in codes of professional responsibility, such as the duty to
uphold and improve the administration of justice, to include a limited duty
of non-discrimination. Some U.S. jurisdictions have enacted specific
non-discrimination provisions in the ethical codes which bind legal
professionals in those jurisdictions. In the final section of the paper, I look
at the implications of the American experience for Canada. I conclude by
proposing two additions for Canadian codes of professional conduct. Both
add aduty of non-discrimination forlawyers, with onebeing more conservative
than the other.
II. Discrimination in the legal profession
Discriminatory practices are deeply embedded in the practice of law.
Within law firms, discrimination until recently took the form of the
outright exclusion of groups such as women from law practice. Today,
discrimination in law offices includes the concentration of women in
certain areas of law practice, and discriminating against lawyers,
particularly women lawyers, who try to balance their work and family
obligations. In courts, both lawyers and judges engage in discriminatory
conduct. Discrimination and harassmentoccurs againstcounsel, witnesses
and jurors.
1. Defining discrimination
A very broad definition of discrimination can be found in the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.'
According to Article 1 of the Convention, discrimination includes:
[a]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference ... which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition or exercise, on
an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.3
The Supreme Court of Canada has considered the meaning of
discrimination in its interpretation of the Canadian Human RightsAct, as
well as in equality rights cases under the Canadian Charter ofRights and
2. G.A. Res. 2106A(XX), 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
3. Id., Article 1.1. The definition in the Convention is in fact a definition of specifically "racial
discrimination", and is restricted to discrimination based on "race, colour, descent, or national
or ethnic origin". However, the substance of the definition can readily be applied in other
contexts.
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Freedoms.4 The cases establish that an intention to discriminate is not an
element of discrimination: rather, it is "the impact of the discriminatory
act or provision upon the person affected which is decisive".5 In Canadian
NationalRailway Co. v. Canada Canadian Human Rights Commission,6
Dickson CJ. (as he then was) cited the following passage with approval
from the Abella Report on equality in employment:
Discrimination... means practices orattitudes thathave whetherby design
or impact the effect of limiting an individual's or group's right to
opportunities generally available because of attributes rather than actual
characteristics...
It is not a question of whether this discrimination is motivated by an
intentional desire to obstruct someone's potential, or whether it is the
accidental by-product of innocently motivated practices or systems. If the
barrier is affecting certain groups in a disproportionately negative way it
is a signal that the practices that lead to this adverse impact may be
discriminatory.7
The cases in the Supreme Court of Canada also establish that harassment
on discriminatory grounds is a form of discrimination. In Janzen v. Platy
Enterprises Ltd.,8 Dickson C.J., writing for the court, held that sexual
harassment is discrimination on the grounds of sex. The Chief Justice
emphasized that sexual harassment creates as much of a barrier to
equality of opportunity as do openly discriminatory policies or practices.
Although the issue in Janzen was harassment on the ground of gender, the
reasoning would be equally applicable to harassment on other grounds,
such as race or age.
Discrimination is unacceptable because it imputes stereotypical
characteristics which are thought to belong to a class of people to the
individual member of the class who is the object of the discrimination. Such
stereotypes (e.g. "women are emotional") are usually inaccuratein describing
4. Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33. See Bhinder v. Canadian National
Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian
Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 (the "Action Travail des Femmes" case);
Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2S.C.R. 84;Andrewsv.Law SocietyofBritish
Columbia, [198911 S.C.R. 143;Brooksv. CanadaSafewayLtd., [198911 S.C.R. 1219; Janzen
v. Platy Enterprises Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252; Syndicat des employis de production du
Quebec et l'Acadie v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 879;
McKinneyv. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229; Canada (Human Rights Commission)
v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892.
5. Andrews v. Law Society of British.Columbia, id., p. 173.
6. Action Travail des Femmes, supra, note 4.
7. R. Abella, Equality in Employment: Royal Commission Report (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1984), quoted in Action Travail des Femmes, id., pp. 1138-39.
8. Supra, note 4.
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the class in general, but if such stereotypes have any probative value, it is
outweighed by their prejudicial effect. As Wilson J. noted in McKinney v.
University of Guelph, stereotypes and prejudice threaten the dignity of the
human person, one of the values central to our democratic society:
The purpose of the equality guarantee is the promotion of human dignity.
This interest is particularly threatened when stereotype and prejudice
inform our interactions with one another, whether on an individual or
collective basis. It is for this reason that the central focus of the equality
guarantee rests upon those vehicles of discrimination, stereotype and
prejudice.9
As I will suggest, discrimination also means the exclusion or devaluation
of perspectives and experiences different from one's own, or from those
of one's cultural, linguistic or ethnic group. As Chief Justice Dickson
recognized in R. v. Oakes,"0 one of the basic values of our free and
democratic society is the accommodation of a plurality of cultural
identities and beliefs:
Canadian society is to be free and democratic. The Court must be guided
by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic society
which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity
of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality,
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group
identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the
participation of individuals in society.
2. Discrimination within the legal profession
There is an extensive and rapidly growing literature on discrimination in
the legal profession. Although much of the literature is American, there
is also a growing body of Canadian scholarship on the subject. My
purpose here is to review some of that literature, and to lay the foundation
for the later discussion of the potential range of responses to discrimination
within the profession. There have been a number of excellent studies of
specific aspects of discrimination within the profession, and of
discrimination within the profession in particular geographic areas, to
which I will be referring in my review.
My focus is on discrimination in the practice of law, and in court. The
issue of discrimination in legal education is beyond the scope of this
paper. This is not to say that discrimination in legal education does not
9. McKinney v. University of Guelph, supra, note 4, p. 391.
10. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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exist; clearly such discrimination does exist." The Special Advisory
Committee to the Canadian Association of Law Teachers reports that
discrimination, both obvious and subtle, is widespread in Canadian law
schools:
There are obvious examples of discrimination and hatred as they are
practised in law schools: racist hypotheticals; exam questions that resort
to homophobic humour; the graffiti in the washrooms; the skits at variety
show; lack of physical access. These instances of outright discrimination
are not difficult to identify. It is the subtle practices of discrimination that
are more hurtful, and insidious: the assumption that racially identified or
disabled students have been admitted on an affirmative action programme;
the assumption that students who are admitted through special programmes
are academically inferior... 12
(i) Discrimination in the practice of law
Visible discrimination within the legal profession has taken a variety of
forms. Initially, members of certain groups were excluded from the
profession entirely. Later, members of those groups were admitted to the
profession, but in limited numbers. Today, members of some groups tend
to be confined to particular areas of practice.
In providing an overview of discrimination in the practice of law, it is
not my intention to lay blame. Much of the discrimination which occurs
is unintentional, and is the product of institutional and social habits. What
is important is for the legal profession to recognize the extent to which
discrimination does exist, and to work together to devise strategies to
combat discrimination.
3
11. See for example, P.A. Monture, "Now that the Door is Open: First Nations and the Law
School Experience" (1990), 15 Queen's L.J. 179; D.M. Engel and A.S. Konefsky, "Law
Students with Disabilities: Removing the Barriers in the Law School Community" (1990), 38
Buffalo L. Rev. 551; R.F. Devlin, "Towards An/Other Legal Education: Some Critical and
Tentative Proposals to Confront the Racism of Modem Legal Education" (1989), 38 U.N.B.
L.J. 89; R.F. Devlin and A.W. MacKay, "An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The
Indigenous Blacks and Micmac Programme at Dalhousie Law School" (1991), 14 Dalhousie
L.J. 296; L.G. Espinoza, "Empowerment and Achievement in Minority Law Student Support
Programs: Constructive Affirmative Action" (1989), 22 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 281; Stanford Law
Project, "Gender, Legal Education and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford
Law Students and Graduates" (1988), 40 Stanford L. Rev. 1209; M. Angel, "Women in Legal
Education: What It's Like to be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing
Women" (1988) 61 Temple L.Q. 799.
12. Special Advisory Committee to the Canadian Association of Law Teachers, Equality in
Legal Education .... Sharing a Vision .... ;Creating the Pathways (June 2, 1991), p. 5.
13. In this regard, it is encouraging to note that the Canadian Bar Association has struck a
"Gender Equality Task Force", chaired by the Honourable Bertha Wilson. The Task Force is
scheduled to report to the Canadian Bar Association in August 1993. J.J. Camp, Q.C., "Gender
Equality Deserves Every Member's Involvement," The National (April 1992), p. 2.
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a. Exclusion from the profession
Groups which have been excluded from the legal profession have
included women, aboriginal people, racial andethnic groups, homosexuals,
the disabled, along with others. The exclusion of women in particular has
received a great deal of scholarly attention in Canada. However, there is
also evidence of the exclusion of aboriginal people and racial and ethnic
groups.
Aboriginal people are under-represented in the legal profession. In
1990, aboriginal people represented 2.3% of the total Canadian population,
but only 0.8% of lawyers. 4 Female aboriginal people represented 1.2%
of the total Canadian population but only 0.3% of lawyers. Discrimination
against racial groups in access to the profession has also been documented.
In 1990, visible minorities represented 5.9% of. the total Canadian
population but only 2.8% of lawyers.' 5
The exclusion of women from the practice of law has been well
documented. Initially, women were denied admission to the legal
profession entirely. The women who tried to enter the profession in the
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were all rebuffed. 6 The
first women admitted to the profession in the United States was Arabella
Mansfield in 1869. In Canada and the British Commonwealth, the first
woman admitted was Clara Brett Martin, who was admitted to the bar in
Ontario in 1897.11 Women were admitted to the bar in other Canadian
provinces between 1912 and 1942.18
Although women may now legally practice law in every Canadian
province and territory, they may still face discrimination in access to the
profession. In the United States, women began to consistently receive
14. B.M. Mazer and M.S.G. Peeris, Access to Legal Education in Canada Datebook 1990
(1990). These figures, provided by Employment and Immigration Canada, are suspect because
of conflicting definitions of aboriginality. Nonetheless, they do provide a strong indication that
aboriginal people are under-represented in the legal profession.
15. Id. Comparable figures were apparently not available for women lawyers.
16. Such early attempts include those of Margaret Brent in seventeenth century Maryland,
Caroline Norton in nineteenth century England, Myra Bradwell in late nineteenth century
Illinois, and Elizabeth Freeman (who argued her own case of emancipation) in Massachusetts
in 1783. C. Menkel-Meadow, "Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making
New Voices in the Law" (1987), 42 U Miami L. Rev., 29, p. 35. The history of the struggle of
women to enter the legal profession in the 19th century in the United States is documented in
Wisberg, "Barred from the Bar: Women And Legal Education in the United States, 1870-1890"
(1977), 28 J. Legal Educ. 485.
17. M.J. Mossman, "'Invisible' Constraints on Laywering and Leadership: The Case of
Women Lawyers" (1988), 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 567 at 568. _
18. M.J. Mossman, "Portia's Progress: Women as Lawyers, Reflections on the Past and
Future," prepared for the Law Society of Upper Canada Continuing Legal Education Program,
"Women in the Legal Profession," May 13, 1986, pp. 1-2.
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interviews only in the 1970s;19 there is no reason to suppose that the
experience of Canadian women was much different. Female applicants
for legal positions may be asked discriminatory questions about their
plans for having children or getting married, about their husband's job,
or about their intentions should their husband be forced to relocate.
b. Discrimination within the profession
Studies about discrimination against those who have successfully gained
access to the profession have emphasized discrimination against women.
This may be because womon-are by far the largest traditionally excluded
group to have gained access to the legal profession. Although the
discussion that follows -also emphasizes discrimination against women,
there is no reason to suppose that analogous forms of discrimination do
not occur against members of other groups. For example, a survey of the
Ontario legal profession published in 1981 demonstrated that Jews were
under-represented in "elite" law firms. While fifteen percent of the
lawyers surveyed were Jewish, not one Jewish lawyer was employed in
an "elite" law firm. Sixteen percent of lawyers in non-elite law firms were
Jewish.20 There has undoubtedly been similar discrimination in the
practice of law against other excluded groups, such as people of colour,
homosexuals and the disabled.
There is evidence that women tend to hold low-status and low-paying
positions within the legal profession. A 1988 study of Toronto lawyers
found that women were more than three times as likely as men to hold
relatively low-status legal positions. When the figures were adjusted to
account for the fact that women had on average been called to the Bar
more recently than men, women were still just over twice as likely to hold
low-status legal positions.21 Nonetheless, a 1984 study of Albertalawyers
found that there was no significant difference between the percentages of
men and women working in firms of various sizes. The study concluded
19. K. Donovan, "Women Associates' Advancement to Partner Status in Private Law Finns"
(1990), 4 Georgetown J. Leg. Ethics 135, p. 137.
20. B.D. Adam and K.A. Lahey, "Professional Opportunities: A Survey of the Ontario Legal
Profession" (1981), 59 Can. Bar Rev. 674, p. 684. For purposes of the survey, an "elite" law
firm was defined as a firm of which one or more members had direct ties with one or more of
the 113 largest corporations in Canada.
21. J. Hagan, M. Huxter, and P. Parker, "Class Structure and Legal Practice: Inequality and
Mobility among Toronto Lawyers" (1988), 22 Law and Soc. Rev. 9, p. 42. See also the
important May 1991 Report of the Women in the Legal Profession Committee of the Law
Society of Upper Canada, Transitions in the Ontario Legal Profession: A Survey of Lawyers
Called to the Bar Between 1975 and 1990.
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that women were notunderrepresentedin larger firms.22However, a study
of Canadian lawyers' earnings found that the earnings of female lawyers
were lower than the earnings of male lawyers of the same age.23 In the
United States, there are remarkable disparities between the earnings of
male and female lawyers. A 1989 American Bar Association subscriber
survey found the average female lawyer made $57,600 while the average
male lawyer earned $132,900.24 Some of the disparity is attributable to the
fact that women have entered the profession relatively recently and tend
to occupy junior positions. Even so, one U.S. survey found that women
were paid less than men even for the same year of graduation and job
category32
In the U.S., significantly fewer women enter large law firms than do
men. A 1989 survey found that while twenty-two percent of minority men
and thirty-four percent of non-minority men entered law firms with 50 or
more lawyers, only fifteen percent of minority women and twenty-four
percent of non-minority women entered law firms of comparable size. On
the other hand, women were more successful than men in obtaining state
judicial clerkships, and government positions. Women were more than
twice as likely to take public interest positions.
26
Within law firms, women are disproportionately represented in certain
areas of practice. 27 Although comprehensive data on this question is not
yet available in Canada, initial reports indicate that there is discrimination
occurring in areas of practice. A 1984 survey of 461 University of Alberta
law school graduates found that women were over-represented in some
areas of practice and under-represented in others. After adjusting for the
relative number of male and female respondents (382 men and 123
women), just over half as many women as men indicated civil litigation
as their primary area of practice. The number of women indicating family
law as their primary area of practice was eight times greater than the
number of men. Women were three times as likely to indicate wills and
trusts as their primary area of practice as men .2 A 1988 survey of 209
22. D. Fromm and M. Webb, "The Work Experience of University of Alberta Law Graduates"
(1985), 23 Alberta L. Rev. 366, p. 370.
23. MJ. Mossman, supra, note 17, pp. 586-87.
24. A.W. Thomer, "Gender and the Profession: The Search for Equal Access" (1990), 4
Georgetown J. Leg. Ethics 81, p. 95, n. 97.
25. Id., p. 95.
26. A.W. Thomer, supra, note 24, p. 95.
27. The concentration of women in particular areas of practice is apparently a result of a
combination of discrimination and personal preference. Of course, the preferences of women
for particular areas of practice may in part be driven by the fact that more overt discrimination
is occurring in other areas of practice.
28. D. Fromm and M. Webb, supra, note 22, pp. 370-7 1.
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women graduates of the Saskatchewan College of Law also indicated that
women were found in disproportionate numbers in limited areas of
practice. The study included only female graduates. The women were
asked to indicate their areas of specialization, and the percentage
breakdown of their answers was as follows: family law (23%); civil
litigation (21%); realestate, wills and estates (15%), corporate/commercial
(15%) and criminal (9%).29 To judge by the Alberta figures, the
Saskatchewan women graduates would appear to be over-represented in
family law and under-represented in civil litigation. The percentage
breakdown of areas of practice for the Alberta survey, for men and
women together, was civil litigation (26%), real estate (13%), criminal
(12%), commercial (10%), corporate (8%), and family (8%).30 A 1991
survey of members of the Law Society of British Columbia found
significant but smaller differences in the percentages of men and women
specializing in particular areas of practice. The survey was relatively
large: 697 women and 1117 men responded to the questionnaire.3
Respondents were asked to. indicate the percentage of their time spent
practising in particular areas of the law. The differences were as follows:
Women spent more concentrated time in bankruptcy and realizations (a
median of 10% as compared to 5% for men), corporate/commercial law
(25% as compared to 20%), family and juvenile law (30% as compared to
20%), immigration and citizenship law (10% as compared to 5%), labour
and workers' compensation (41% as compared to 15%), and municipal
law (10% as compared to 5%). The men spent more concentrated time in
environmental law (a median of 10% as compared to 5% for women) and
securities (35% as compared to 28%)32
The U.S. experience is similar: women are found in disproportionate
numbers in trusts, estates and family law rather than litigation and
corporate work. Even where women work in high profile areas such as
29. J. Savarese, M. Keet, and K. Sutherland, "Survey of Women Graduates from the College
of Law 1988" (Sakatoon: Women and the Law, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan,
1988).
30. Supra, note 22, p. 370.
31. J. Brockman, Identifying the Barriers: A Survey of Members of the Law Society of British
Columbia (April 1991), prepared for theLaw Society of British Columbia's Subcommittee on
Women in the Legal Profession, p. vii. Parts of this study are to be published as "Gender Bias
in the Legal Profession: A Survey of Members of the Law Society of B.C." (1992), 17 Queen's
L.J. 91.
32. Id., p. 21. Figures for the areas of practice for women lawyers in Nova Scotia are found
in A.S. Derrick, "Women in the Legal Profession in Nova Scotia" (April, 1980), on file with
Brent Cotter, Dalhousie Law School.
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litigation, they are often subordinate to men in those fields, and are
assigned to do background work such as research and drafting.33
There is also evidence that women experience sexual harassment
within the legal pfofession. According to the Law Society of B.C. survey,
33.7% of female respondents and 10.2% of male respondents "had
observed or experienced female lawyers being subjected to unwanted
sexual advances by other lawyers. '34 An even greater number of
respondents (68.2% of women and 34.5% of men) had observed or
personally experienced female lawyers being subjected to "teasing,jokes
or comments of a sexual nature by other lawyers."35 Six of the respondents
in the Saskatchewan study identified sexual harassment as a problem. 6
c. Maternity, paternity and child-rearing,
Women who have children also face discrimination. This discrimination
takes a variety of forms. Female lawyers are much more likely than male
lawyers to work part-time, or to work in less demanding areas of the legal
profession, in order to accommodate child-rearing responsibilities. This
was the conclusion reached by the Saskatchewan survey. The authors
summarized the responses as follows:
Some (9) [women] insisted that only some areas of law or some situations
within the profession are compatible with the mother role. Within the
profession, employment in a small firm might be more conducive, where
competition levels are lower. A general practice might be easier than a
high-profile, intense litigation practice .... The most popular argument ...
was that private practice is the worst area to be in. The area of research and
writing, or employment with government were suggested: "a female
lawyer needs to be employed in the public sector with the benefits of
maternity leave, sick leave, regular holidays and comparatively normal
work hours. '37
The Alberta survey found that women were somewhat under-represented
in private practice (45% of men were in private practice vs. 39% of
women), and over-represented in government positions (20% of women
were in government positions vs. 8% of men).38 The more recent B.C.
33. K.Donovan, supra, note32, pp. 150-51; C. Menkel-Meadow,"Women inLaw? AReview
of Cynthia Fuchs Epstein's Women in Law" (1983), 1983 Am. Bar Found. Resrch. J. 189, p.
196. See also L.B. Matarese, M.J.E. Danner and R.J. Simon, "A Survey of GenderBias Among
Corporate/Securities Lawyers: Does it Exist?" (1989), 14 J. Legal Prof. 49.
34. J. Brockman, supra, note 31, p. 40.
35. Id., p. 40.
36. J. Savarese, M. Keet, K. Sutherland, supra, note 29, p. 27.
37. J. Savarese, M. Keet and K. Sutherland, supra, note 29, pp. 12-13.
38. D. Fromm and M. Webb, supra, note 22, pp. 369-70.
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survey produced similar results, although the differences were less
dramatic. More men worked in private practice than women (69.7% of the
men vs. 59.9% of the women), and more women worked in government
positions, or as government lawyers (14% of the women vs. 8.8% of the
men).3 9
The American experience indicates that female lawyers are more
likely to make changes to their careers to accommodate children. One
survey was carried out in 1981-86 of graduates of the University of
Michigan Law School. Over 1,000 graduates responded to the survey.
The survey found that many women, but few men, had made adjustments
to the amount of time they spent at work:
Many women, but few men, have made such adjustments.... [A]t the time
of the 1984 questionnaire, 28% of women with children were working part
time or had ceased working outside the home. In 1986, when the classes
we surveyed had been out of law school seven to ten years, nearly 70% of
the women with children reported that, at some point since law school, they
had, for three or more months, worked part time or stopped working
outside the home altogether. A quarter of the women with children had
taken much longer periods - at least 18 months - of either full-time
parenting or part-time work. Very few men had ever taken leaves of
absence or worked part time to care for children, although a few men said
they were constrained by the roles expected of men from asking their
employers for leaves that women were freely granted.40
The same survey also found that women chose not to work in private
practice because they could achieve a better balance between work and
family in other settings:
... five years after law school and again in 1984, 70% of men in these
classes but only 44% of women worked in private practice. When, in one
of our follow-up questionnaires, we asked the respondents whether they
had any explanation for this difference in work settings, the most common
explanation offered by women and the second most common offered by
men was that women avoided private practice because they wanted
settings where they could achieve an acceptable balance between work and
their family or private lives. Many individual women described leaving a
firm for family-related reasons. Many men reported with some remorse
that men tolerate conditions that women refuse to accept. As one male
expressed it, "Law firms consume 200% of one's time. There is no stability
of hours and it is difficult to have a family life, or any other life." The
perception that private practice interferes with fat-ily life is supported by
our consistent finding that those who work in private practice - and
especially those who work in large firms - are less satisfied with the
39. J. Brockman, supra, note 31, p. 16.
40. D.L. Chambers, "Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers and the
Balance of Work and Family" (1989), 14 Law & Soc. Inquiry 251, p. 268. The survey was of
graduates of the classes of 1976-79.
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balance of their family and professional lives than persons working in
other settings.4'
An earlier survey of major U.S. law firms and of Stanford Law School
students reached similar conclusions. 42
A furtherform of discrimination experiencedby women is that women
who have children may experience difficulties in combining work with
childcare responsibilities. As M.J. Mossman has said, a woman lawyer
can only succeed by becoming "a competent professional without
significant family interests or responsibilities." 43 This point is illustrated
by the 1991 .survey of members of the Law Society of B.C. The
consequences experienced by male and female lawyers who had had
children within the last five years were remarkably different. While
23.5% of women indicated they had experienced "loss of seniority", only
0.6% of the men indicated they had experienced the same consequence
of having children. Of women, 32.2% indicated they had experienced a
"delay in promotion"; the figure for men was only 1.0%. Women
experienced greater consequences than men in a number of other categories
as well, including loss of office space (12.8% of women vs. 0% of men),
unreasonable work load following parental leave (24.8% of women vs.
3.2% of men), loss ofjob (11.4% of women vs. 0% of men), and loss of
income (62.4% of women vs. 10.7% of men).44 Interestingly, in a 1987
survey of Canadian lawyers, 87.5% of respondents answered "no" to the
question, "Should a woman's wish to have children be a factor in making
her partner?"
45
Although some law firms and other employers are attempting to
address the problems experienced by women who have children, the
figures just cited would indicate that these attempts have not so far been
very successful. In Canada, maternity leave policies tend not to be
favourable .to women. The Saskatchewan survey found that for those
women whose employers did have maternity leave policies, the policy
generally provided only for leave without pay:
The most common policy cited was a leave of up to one year without pay.
Several were allowed aleave of 6 months, and others of up to 3 or4 months.
Although only two were offered at least a couple months pay, the
occasional policy did include a guarantee of no loss of seniority.4
41. Id., pp. 2 60-7 1.
42. Stanford Law Project, "Law Finns and Lawyers with Children: An Empirical Analysis of
Family/Work Conflict" (1982), 34 Stanford L. Rev. 1263, pp. 1274-75.
43. M.J. Mossman, supra, note 18, p. 9 .
44. J. Brockman, supra, note 31, p. 46
45. "Gender Discrimination: A Tricky Question" (March 1988), Canadian Lawyer 8.
46. J. Savarese, M. Keet and K. Sutherland, supra, note 29, p. 7.
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In the more recent B.C. survey, 55.4% of women reported that unpaid
maternity leave was available. Paid maternity leave was reported to be
available for partners by 12.9% of women, and for associates and
employees by 15.5% of women. For both partners and associates, the
median length of paid maternity leave was 16 weeks.47
The U.S. figures appear to indicate'that American legal employers
have policies more favourable to women. In the 1982 Stanford study,
94% of law firms reported at least some paid maternity leave was
available, with between six weeks and three months of paid leave being
the most common. Interestingly, in the Stanford study, the paid maternity
leave policies of government, corporate and public interest employers
were much less generous than those provided by law firms.48
Even women who work for employers with generous maternity leave
benefits may still experience discrimination. Although firms may publicly
proclaim their commitment to such arrangements, "many women who
have availed themselves of such plans have quietly acknowledge that
they are never again accepted as serious members of their firm."49 Women
who take advantage of maternity leave policies tend to be disadvantaged
with respect to work assignments and promotions to partnership. 0
While it is women who must bear children, there is no reason why
women alone must raise them. Indeed, some employers do provide
paternity leave benefits. In the B.C. survey, 14.4% of men reported that
unpaid paternity leave was available from their employer. The figures
were considerably lower for paid paternity leave: 2.5% of men reported
that paid paternity leave was available for partners, and 2.4% of men
reported that paid paternity leave was available for associates and
employees. 51 The American experience appears to be similar. In the
Stanford study, paternity leave policies were found to be virtually
non-existent:
Paternity policies generally do not exist or are not used. When paternity
policies are used, leave is short and often unpaid. Only one-fifth (39/195)
of law firms have either paternity policies or individual experience with
paternity leave. Moreover, only 43% of law firm paternity leave policies
provide paid leave (13/30). Furthermore, the existence of a paternity
policy does not mean that the firm expects male lawyers to use it. Desire
to make policies formally gender-neutral, rather than male employee
demand, may explain some employers' adoption of paternity policies.
47. J. Brockman, supra, note 31, pp. 25-26.
48. Stanford Law Project, supra, note 42, pp. 1269-71. The fact that these figures are
employer-reported may be significant.
49. C. Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 33, p. 197.
50. A.W. Thomer, supra, note 24, pp. 105-6.
51. J. Brockman, supra, note 31, p. 25.
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Only half (9/18) of law firm paternity policies had everbeen used [only 18
law firms gave an answer to this survey question] and the paternity leaves
taken generally ranged from only a few days to a few weeks. However,
where paternity policies were used, they were used regularly.
2
The child-rearing experiences of legal professionals indicate that
women experience discrimination in this area as well. Male and female
lawyers divide child-care responsibilities between themselves, their
live-in partner if they have one, and paid child-care workers differently.
In the B.C. study, on average women with children reported that they
were responsible for 46% of child-care, the person they lived with or the
non-resident parent for 25%, and a child-care worker for 26%. On
average men with children reported that they were responsible for 24%
of child-care, the person they lived with or the non-resident parent for
65% and a child-care worker for 10%.51 Another possible child-care
strategy is child-care at work, but few legal employers provide such
child-care. In the B.C. study, only 1.1% of women and 0.8% of men
reported that their employers provided child care.
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(ii) Discrimination in court
Discrimination in court can take a variety of different forms. It can
include harassment of lawyers, witnesses or court personnel, as well as
the exclusion of people (particularly jurors) from the court process on
discriminatory grounds. While there is a great deal of U.S. material on
discrimination in court, there is at present little Canadian material. In the
analysis that follows, I rely on the U.S. material. Although there are
undoubtedly differences between the U.S. and Canadian experiences, it
seems reasonable to assume that at least some of the problems identified
in the U.S. also exist in Canada. While much more Canadian research is
needed, what evidence there is tends to support the assumption that the
Canadian experience is not dramatically different from that in the U.S.
The U.S. literature on discrimination in court is concerned largely with
the issue of discrimination on the basis of gender. As of September 1990,
more than thirty American states had task forces appointed by state chief
justices to examine gender discrimination in their court systems.55 Thirteen
of these have published reports: California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
52. Stanford Law Project, supra, note 42, p. 1272. That paternity leave policies are used
regularly if they are used at all may indicate that the reason men do not take advantage of such
policies is because of pressure from law firms not to do so.
53. J. Brockman, supra, note 31, p. 47.
54. Id., p. 25.
55. L.H. Schafran, "The Obligation to Intervene: New Direction from the American Bar
Association Code of Judicial Conduct" (1990), 4 Georgetown J. Leg. Ethics 53, p. 55.
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Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island and Washington State.5 6 In addition, there is a
substantial amount of U.S.. material on race discrimination. This is
paralleled in Canada by a growing literature on discrimination against
aboriginal people.
a. The role of the judge
On the basis of the collective conclusions of the U.S. state task force
reports on gender discrimination, it is reasonable to conclude that judges
frequently engage in discriminatory behaviour. A survey of the U.S. state
task force reports on gender discrimination concluded that "male judges
and lawyers treat female judges, judicial candidates, attorneys, parties
and witnesses differently and worse than they treat males." 57 The evidence
also indicates thatjudges seldom intervene to stop discriminatory behaviour
by other actors in their courtrooms. The New York task force on gender
discrimination found that only twelve percent of female lawyers surveyed
and seven percent of men'said that they had ever seen a judge intervene
to correct gender discrimination. In Massachusetts only four percent of
lawyer respondents had seen such intervention. 8 Of judges who do
intervene, the evidence indicates that the majority are female. For
example, in Maryland, forty-four percent of female judges but only
thirteen percent of male judges indicated they had ever intervened
because they observed gender bias in their courtrooms.5 9
There is some evidence 6f gender discrimination from the bench in
Canada. According to one Canadian study, a number of women reported
"negative" reactions from the bench:
Eight women noted negative reactions from the Bench. These occasionally
involve an express statementfromajudge that law, or litigation specifically,
is not an appropriate career for a woman. More often, however, subtle
discrimination was described such as body language signalling inattention
or hostility, winking, or the use of references such as "dear, girls,
sweetheart". One respondent explained, "to win, I had to have a perfect
case, not just a better one tha[n] on the other side".
There is .also anecdotal evidence of sexual harassment by Canadian
judges. During a 1989 trial, one Quebec judge remarked that, "Rules, like
women, are made to be violated."'61 According to a news report, a N.W.T.
56. Id., pp. 55-6.
57. K. Czapanskiy, "GenderBias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies" (1990),4 Georgetown
J. Leg. Ethics 1, p. 2.
58. L.H. Schafran, supra, note 55, p. 66.
59. Id., p. 67.
60. J. Savarese, M. Keet and K. Sutherland, supra, note 29, p. 27.
61. M. Habib, Canadian Press, August 23, 1991.
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judge commented that rapes were different in the north because the
women is frequently drunk and passed out: "The man comes along, sees
apair of hips and.helps himself."62 AManitobajudge who had fined a man
$300 for slapping his wife made the following comments:
How does a person admonish his wifeif she goes out on the town with other
people, to wit: guys, drinking, and comes home late when she should have
been home looking after the children or cooking, or whatever else she is
expected to do?... Sometimes a slap in the face is all she needs and might
not be unreasonable force after all; but here, there was at least a slap in the
face to which he [the accused] has pleaded guilty and is prepared to suffer
the consequences.63
The U.S. material indicates that the failure of judges to intervene to
stop gender discrimination is the result of at least two factors. First,
gender discrimination is socially acceptable in many circles. Judges may
consider comments on women's appearance appropriate because women
are considered to be displayed for men's appraisal. One researcher who
reviewed a number of studies of judicial attitudes concluded that
gender-biased myths and stereotypes are embedded in the attitudes of
many male judges.64 While judges may now consider racist remarks
off-limits, sexist remarks are more likely to be considered acceptable. 65
As the Nevada Supreme Court Gender Bias Task Force concluded, "[t]he
types of discourtesies and disrespectful conduct mentioned in this report
are insidious principally because of the failure among the offenders to
realize their existence. '66 The second reason judges fail to intervene to
stop gender discrimination is that many judges are concerned that
intervention may prejudice the outcome of the case. Judges worry that
intervening without waiting for an objection from counsel will make
matters worse for the lawyer or witness who is the subject of discrimination
or harassment.67
b. Harassment of women lawyers
The harassment experienced by women lawyers in American courts from
both judges and counsel is well-documented. In some cases the harassment
62. Canadian Press, February 10, 1990.
63. Canadian Press, April 12, 1989.
64. N. Wikler, "On the Judicial Agenda for the 80s: Equal Treatment for Men and Women in
the Courts" (1980), 64 Judicature 202.
65. J. Johnston and C. Knapp, "Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective"
(1971), 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675.
66. Quoted in L. H. Schafran, supra, note 55, p. 7 2.
67. Id., pp. 72-4. The general failure to intervene may also be the result of the paucity of women
judges (see below).
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is overt; more often it is insidious and subtle. Sexist remarks by judges are
damaging because they affect the credibility of women lawyers. When a
judge calls a lawyer "honey", he indicates that he sees her as something
other than a skilled professional. Such comments may cause the client to
lose confidence in the lawyer. In one case, the client was so concerned as
a result of sexist remarks about his female lawyer by the judge that he
asked to be represented by a male lawyer.68 Such comments also have a
wider effect: they lessen the dignity and respect accorded every woman
lawyer.
69
The evidence is also that sexual trial tactics by lawyers are common in
the U.S. Such tactics include using terms of endearment, making comments
about looks and clothing, and any remarks that call attention to the lawyer
as a woman instead of as a lawyer.70 Tactics directly attacking a female
lawyer's credibility are also common. Opposing counsel may imply that
the possible range of knowledge of a female lawyer is limited. According
to a member of the Washington Public Defenders' Association, "I have
seen attorneys attack the credibility of a witness or litigant on a sex basis
because the area of testimony was beyond the stereotypical knowledge of
a female - or that 'her emotions' have clouded her perception. '71 Jill
Wine-Banks, the former Watergate prosecutor, recounts how at one trial
the opposing counsel sniffed the air over her shoulder while saying "nice
perfume" to the jury. Whenever there was a bench conference, he would
pull out her chair and take her elbow to help her up the stairs to the bench.
Wine-Banks was able to put a stop to these tactics:
At the next bench conference, when my opponent put his hand on my
elbow, I turned to him and said loudly enough for the judge to hear, "Get
your hands off me and don't ever touch me again." The judge almost fell
off his chair but the lawyer never touched me again.72
Such trial tactics have traditionally been considered to be an acceptable
part of the trial lawyer's arsenal. However, advocacy on the basis of
stereotypes and "imputed characteristics which, if not purely imaginary,
are nonetheless inapplicable to many members of the group"7 3 is
68. J.A. Levine, "Preventing Gender Bias in the Courts: A Question of Judicial Ethics" (1988),
1 Georgetown J. Leg. Ethics 775, pp. 785-7.
69. Id.
70. K. Koustensis, "Sexual Trial Tactics: The Ability of the Model Code and Model Rules to
Discipline Discriminatory Conflicts Between Adversaries" (1990), 4 Georgetown J. Leg.
Ethics 153, pp. 155-6.
71. Washington State Task Force on Gender and Justice in the Courts, Gender and Justice in
the Courts (1989), p. 125, quoted in L.H. Schafran, supra, note 55, p. 60.
72. Quoted in L.H. Schafran, "Women as Litigators: Abilities vs. Assumptions" (August
1983), Trial 37, pp. 38-39.
73. J.D. Johnston, Jr. and C.L. Knapp, supra, note 65, p. 738.
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increasingly understood to be prejudicial to the administration of justice,
even within an adversarial context. This may be part of a larger trend
towards the recognition of the adverse effects of gender stereotypes
within the legal system. 4 One American court used strong language to
underline the unacceptability of harassment, including sexual harassment,
in court:
[T]his kind of harassment is particularly intolerable. Any kind of conduct
or verbal oppression or intimidation that projects offensive and invidious
discriminatory distinctions, be it based on race or color, as in this case, or,
in other contexts, on gender, or ethnic or national background or handicap
is especially offensive. In the context of either the practice of law or the
administration of justice, prejudice both to the standing of the profession
and the administration ofjustice willbe virtually conclusive if intimidation,
abuse, harassment, or threats focus or dwell on invidious discriminatory
distinctions.
7
Moreover, not only are such tactics prejudicial to the administration of
justice, they put women lawyers in an impossible position. If a woman
lawyer draws attention to the discriminatory conduct by objecting, she
may alienate the judge or jury, whether or not her objection succeeds. On
the other hand, if she ignores the discriminatory conduct, she may be
perceived as weak and the tactics may consequently succeed in
undermining her credibility. In the result, her client's interests may
suffer.
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c. Discrimination against witnesses
The treatment of witnesses by the judicial system is central to the
administration of justice. Discrimination against a witness will affect her
or his credibility. It is not only humiliating to the witness but is likely to
have an impact on the outcome of the case.77 One tactic is to attack the
credibility of a female witness by making her appear to be promiscuous.
In the New York trial of the man who hired thugs to slash the face of Marla
Hanson because she had refused his advances, the defense attorney
addressed thejury with these words: "I will tell you about a woman named
Marla Hanson, who was after every man in this city who had a woman,
who preyed on men and their relationships with women.7 The reports
of the U.S. state task forces on gender discrimination confirm that gender
74. See for example Lavallee v. The Queen, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
75. In re Vincenti, 554 A.2d 470 (N.J. 1989), p. 474.
76. K. Koustensis, supra, note 70, p. 157.
77. See Final Report of the Rhode Island Committee on Women in the Courts (1987), p. 12,
quoted in L.H. Schafran, supra, note 55, p. 64.
78. A. Smith, "How Many Times Does a Victim Have to Pay", Esquire, November 1987, p. 83.
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stereotypes are used to undermine the credibility of female witnesses.
The Minnesota task force asked this question of lawyers and judges: "[do]
defense attorneys appeal to gender stereotypes (for example, 'women say
no when they mean yes'; 'provocative dress is an invitation') in order to
discredit the victim in criminal sexual conduct cases[?]" Seventy-seven
percent of female lawyers and seventy-two percent of male lawyers
answered "sometimes," "often" or "always." The Maryland task force
asked whether judges in rape cases "control the court so as to protect the
complaining witness from improper questioning." Fifty-eight percent of
judges who expressed an opinion answered "never.
79
Court personnel may also discriminate against female witnesses. The
U.S. state gender discrimination reports found that in some cases court
personnel ridicule battered women seeking protective orders. According
to one witness, "[i]ntake officers, often the first court personnel to see the
victim, are nottaking this crime seriously unless the physical signs are too
obvious to ignore.
'80
d. Discrimination against clients and accused
Discrimination may also occur against clients and accused. The
consequences of this form of discrimination can be severe, as the result
can be an unjust conviction. There is evidence that such discrimination
occurs against aboriginal people in Canada. The best-known example is
that of Donald Marshall Jr., a Mi'kmaq who spent eleven years in prison
for a murder he did not commit. The Royal Commission on the Donald
Marshall Jr. Prosecution acknowledged in its Report8 l that racism had
played a part in Marshall's wrongful conviction. The Report found a
pattern of incompetence in the handling of Marshall's case. It found that
the lawyers and judges involved in the case had failed to discharge their
professional obligations. The original prosecutor failed to disclose
contradictory statements by witnesses, and Marshall's lawyer failed to
argue a complete defence. On appeal, both the Crown and the defence
failed to recognize serious evidentiary errors made at trial. When Marshall's
conviction was finally overturned after a reference to the Nova Scotia
Courtof Appeal, the Court minimized any injustice, calling any miscarriage
of justice "more apparent than real."82 The Court also stated that "Donald
Marshall's untruthfulness through this whole affair contributed in large
79. Data from L.H. Schafran, id.
80. Quoted in L.H. Schafran, id., p. 63,-n. 43.
81. Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution (Halifax, Government of the
Province of Nova Scotia, 1989).
82. R. v. Marshall (1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 286, p. 321 (C.A.).
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measure to his conviction. 83 The Royal Commission Report implies that
the pattern of incompetence and misconduct was in part the result of the
fact that Marshall was Mi'kmaq. 4
As a result of the Report of the Royal Commission, an Inquiry
Committee was established under the Judges Act 5 to determine whether
the judges of the Court of Appeal who heard the reference should be
removed from office. The Committee determined that the judges should
not be removed from office, but nonetheless severely criticized them for
their handling of the case:
We would go so far as to suggest that the Court, in seeming to attribute to
Marshall exclusive responsibility for the wrongful conviction, and thereby
inferentially exculpating the other persons and factors demonstrated in the
record to have played a key role in that conviction, so seriously
mischaracterized the evidence before it as to commit legal error... 86
Although the Royal Commission report acknowledged the existence
of discrimination against Donald Marshall Jr., the report has been
criticized for being excessively timid. Others have argued that the Nova
Scotia justice system is characterized by systemic racism against
Mi'kmaqs. Like women, Mi'kmaqs are the victims of stereotypes and
"imputed characteristics which, if not purely imaginary, are nonetheless
inapplicable to many members of the group." 87 Mi'kmaqs are seriously
disadvantaged in court by these imputed characteristics; to be a Mi'kmaq
means:
... being presumed to be inferior, unworthy, untrustworthy, savage, a liar
and a thief. It means being a member of a sub-class which is, by
implication, responsible for any official perfidy."8
The Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, The Justice
System andAboriginal People,9 went further than the Nova Scotia Royal
Commission in identifying systemic racism against aboriginal people.
The Aboriginal Justice Inquiry concluded that the extraordinary
over-representation of aboriginal people in Manitoba prisons was the
83. Id., p. 322.
84. M.E. Turpel, "Further Travails of Canada's Human Rights Record: The Marshall Case"
(1991), 3 Int'l J. Can. Studies 27.
85. R.S.C. 1985, c. J-l, s. 63(1).
86. Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of the Inquiry Committee Established Pursuant
to Subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act at the Request of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia
(August 1990), p. 35.
87. See text accompanying note 73, supra. The Nova Scotia justice system certainly
discriminates against blacks as well.
88. M.E. Turpel, supra, note 84, p. 43 .
89. Manitoba Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, The
Justice System and Aboriginal People (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991).
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result both of the "long history of discrimination" against aboriginal
people, and of continuing "overt racism":
... Aboriginal people constitute approximately 12% of the Manitoba
population. Yet, Aboriginal people account for over one-half of the 1,600
people incarcerated on any given day of the year in Manitoba's correctional
institutions.
This is a shocking fact. Why, in a society where justice is supposed to
be blind, are the inmates of our prisons selected so overwhelmingly from
a single ethnic group? Two answers suggest themselves immediately:
either Aboriginal people commit a disproportionate number of crimes, or
they are the victims of a discriminatory justice system. We believe that
both answers are correct, but not in the simplistic terms that some people
might interpret them. We do not believe, for instance, that there is anything
about Aboriginal people or their culture that predisposes them to criminal
behaviour. Instead, we believe that the causes of Aboriginal criminal
behaviour are rooted in a long history of discrimination and social
inequality that has impoverished Aboriginal people and consigned them to
the margins of Manitoban society.
Since racism exists throughout Manitoban and Canadian Society, we
have found that overt racism also exists in the administration of Manitoba's
justice system °
e. Jury selection
Discrimination may also occur in the selection of the jury for a civil or
criminal trial. Such discrimination may take the form of mandatory or
permissive exemption by law, or of the selection of jury members on
discriminatory criteria. Women constitute one group which has been
excluded from jury duty by law.9' Their exclusion has generally been
supported by discriminatory stereotypes. A modest catalog of such
stereotypes is found in a New York case which found that the New York
statute granting women a permissive exemption from jury duty was
constitutional:
Granted that some women pursue business careers, the great majority
constitute the heart of the home, where they are busy engaged in the
24-hour day task [sic] of producing and rearing children, providing a home
for the entire family, and performing the daily household work, all of
which demands their full energies. Although some women now question
this arrangement, the state legislature has permitted the exemption in order
not to risk disruption of this basic family unit. Its action was far from
arbitrary. 92
90. Id., p. 85.
91. J.D. Johnston, Jr. and C.L. Knapp, supra, note 65, p. 708ff.
92. Leighton v. Goodman, 311 F. Supp. 1181 (1970).
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Discrimination in the selection ofjurors by litigants has received little
attention in Canada. In civil and criminal trials, lawyers may exercise
peremptory challenges without cause to exclude potential membersof the
jury. In criminal trials, the process of jury selection is governed by ss.
629-641 of the Criminal Code.93 Parties in criminal proceedings are
entitled to any number of challenges for cause. 94 Depending on the
seriousness of the offence charged, the accused is entitled under s. 633 to
challenge four, twelve or twenty jurors peremptorily. While the prosecutor
is only entitled to challenge four jurors peremptorily, her power under s.
634 to direct up to forty-eightjurors to "stand aside" effectively increases
the number of peremptory challenges to which she is entitled to fifty-two.9
Peremptory challenges may also be permitted in civil trials.96
The use of peremptory challenges to affect the racial composition of
the jury is common in the United States, whether or not race is a
substantive issue in the case2 7 Commentators "... have traditionally
claimed that Blacks, Jews and Irish side with civil plaintiffs and criminal
defendants while Germans, Scandinavians and English favor prosecutors
and civil defendants."98 Lawyers also consider racial factors in deciding
where to file their case, considering for example whether the case should
be filed in a predominantly white or black neighbourhood.9
Jury selection by counsel may also occur on the basis of gender. In one
New York case the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike
three black women from the jury. The prosecutor assured the judge that
the women were struck on the basis of sex and not race: "The challenge[s]
... are challenges based upon gender and not challenges based upon race.
What I mean by that is it is my position that men tend to be less
sympathetic than women....",100 The New York Supreme Court held that
the standards for systematic exclusion based on race should apply equally
to exclusion based on gender, because of the abhorrent nature of gender
discrimination. Referring to the New York report on gender discrimination
in the courts, the Supreme Court stated that it was:
93. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended.
94. Id., s. 638.
95. Id., s. 634 ("stand by"). Section 634 of the Criminal Code was struck down by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Bain, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91.
96. See for example Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rule 34.07.
97. T. Kaine, "Race, Trial Strategy and Legal Ethics" (1990), 24 U. Richmond L. Rev. 361.
98. Id., pp. 363-4.
99. Id., p. 362.
100. People v. S.R., 517 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Supp. 1987), p. 866.
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... acutely aware that women, as a group, are often not treated in the same
way as men by our Courts, both as attorneys and litigants and participants
within the legal system .... This Court considers discrimination based on
gender, as well as discrimination based on race, "... the basest kind of
misbehaviour. "10
Another jury selection practice which amounts to gender discrimination
is asking prospective female jurors about their marital status and what
their husbands do without asking similar questions of male jurors. 10 2 In
one Canadian case, the Crown used its stand-asides for the admitted
purpose of excluding male jurors and selecting an entirely female jury.103
Discrinfii tion in the selection of juries by lawyers is undesirable not
only because it depends on stereotypes which rest on dubious factual
grounds, but also because such stereotypes have an adverse effect on
public confidence in the administration of justice. This point was
recognized by the United States Supreme Court inBatson v. Kentucky.) 4
In that case, the prosecutor had used the peremptory challenges which
were available to him to eliminate all four prospective black jurors (the
accused was black). In holding that peremptory challenges cannot be
exercised on the basis of racial assumptions, the court focused on the
possible prejudicial effect on the administration of justice:
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted
on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries
undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.05
The Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba concluded that there was
overwhelming evidence of discrimination against aboriginal people in
the selection of Manitoba juries. Before 1983, aboriginal people were
excluded from lists of potential jurors in the province:
101. Id., p. 866.
102. L.H. Schafran, supra, note 55, p. 62.
103. The accused's appeal was allowed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, on the ground that the
manner in which Crown counsel exercised the stand-asides gave the appearance that the
prosecution had obtained a favourablejury: R. v. Pizzacalla (unreported, Ont. C.A., November
12, 1991). Some recent U.S. cases have found that the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment prohibits gender discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. See J.W.
Morehead, "Exploring the Frontiers of Batson v. Kentucy: Should the Safeguards of Equal
Protection Extend to Gender" (1990), 14 Am. J. Trial Advocacy 289.
104. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
105. T. Kaine, supra, note 97, pp. 369-372. InHollandv. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), the U.S.
Supreme Court took what was arguably a step back from its ruling in Batson by holding that
the use of peremptory challenges by the prosecutor to exclude black jurors did not violate the
Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (which guarantees a defendant an impartial jury).
See A. Biedenbender, "Holland v. Illinois: A Sixth Amendment Attack on the Use of
Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges" (1991), 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 651.
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From its inception, the legal system in Manitoba has systematically
excluded Aboriginal people from juries. This discrimination has taken
many forms. Jurors have traditionally been drawn from lists of voters.
Since Indians or persons of Indian blood were denied the vote in Manitoba
from 1886 until 1952, they were effectively excluded from sitting onjuries
because reserve officials, unlike the mayors and reeves of municipalities,
were not required to submit the names of potential jurors to the chief
County Court judge. This policy was changed in 1971 and reserves were
obliged to submit names drawn from their electoral lists. As was the case
with lists from non-Aboriginal communities, these lists suffered from a
lack of attention and were not regularly updated. It was not until 1983,
when the province began using the computerized records of the Manitoba
Health Services Commission, that Aboriginal people began to be properly
represented on the lists of potential jurors. For a century the legal system
made it clear that it did not want or need Aboriginal jurors. It is a message
Aboriginal people have not forgotten.'0 6
While aboriginal people are now properly represented in lists of
potential jurors, discrimination against aboriginal jurors continues in
Manitoba. The Inquiry found that such discrimination takes a number of
forms. On the one hand, the manner in which jurors are summoned tends
to discourage aboriginal participation in the jury system: aboriginal
people are less likely to have adequate mail service to receive their
summons, are less likely to have full phone service, and may be excused
fromjury duty on the grounds that the trial will be conducted in a language
they cannot understand. Because it is the practice of sheriffs to send out
more summons than the number of prospective jurors that are actually
required, the sheriff will stop pressing jurors to attend once the number
set for the panel has been reached. The latecomers are often aboriginal. 07
Moreover, peremptory challenges and stand asides are frequently used to
exclude aboriginal people. l08The Report gives a startling but apparently
representative example of such discrimination:
On one day of the Thompson assizes in January 1989, 35 of 41 Aboriginal
people who were called to serve on threejuries were rejected. In one case,
the Crown rejected 16 Aboriginal jurors,; in another, the defence rejected
two and the Crown rejected 10; in the third and final case, the defence
accepted all the proposed Aboriginal jurors, while the Crown rejected
nine. Two jurors were rejected twice. °9
106. Manitoba Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People,supra,
note 89, pp. 378-79.
107. Id., pp. 382-83.
108. The Inquiry concluded that, "it is common practice for some Crown attorneys and defence
counsel to exclude aboriginaljurors through the use ofstand-asides and peremptory challenges."
Id., p. 384.
109. Id., p. 384.
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3. The exclusion of different voices
It is my contention that discrimination can not only take the form of limits
on access and of harassment, but that it can also take the form of the
exclusion and devaluation of the perspectives of groups such as women,
aboriginal people, persons of colour, homosexuals, the disabled and other
historically excluded groups. I would argue that the exclusion of
perspectives, or "voices", from the legal profession and the legal system
is insidious and pervasive. This argument is not novel: the argument that
certain voices have been excluded has been made eloquently by women,'10
aboriginal people,"' and persons of colour.112 The exclusion of such
voices is harmful to every member of the legal profession. Not only does
devaluing the perspectives and experiences of excluded groups make the
legal profession a less hospitable environment for members of those
groups, it impoverishes legal culture generally. The failure of traditional
legal approaches in the face of a wide spectrum of difficult issues, from
childcareto recidivism to the quality of life of practitioners is evident. The
legal profession will be much better able to address these issues if it can
call upon the widest possible range of perspectives and experiences.
This is not to say that there is a single "women's perspective", or a
single "aboriginal voice". There is not. As Angela Harris has eloquently
pointed out, if anyone has a single identity, it is because he or she wills
it, not because of a particular cultural or biological origin. The self
contains many perspectives and many voices:
... we are not born with a "self," but rather are comprised of a welter of
partial, sometimes contradictory, or even antithetical "selves." A unified
110. See for example, A.C. Scales, "Feminists in the Field of Time" (1990), 42 Florida L. Rev.
95, C.A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989); J. Morgan, "Feminist Theory as LegalTheory" (1988), 16 Melbourne
Univ. L. Rev. 743; M. Kline, "Race, Racism and Feminist Legal Theory" (1989), 12 Harvard
Women's L.J. 115; F. Olsen, "Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis" (1984),
63 Texas L. Rev. 387; C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989).
111. See M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter. Interpretive Monopolies,
Cultural Differences" (1989-1990), 6 C.H.R.Y.B. 3; M.E. Turpel, "Patriarchy and Paternalism:
The Legacy of the Canadian State for First Nations Women" (1991), unpublished MS; P.
Monture, "Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah" (1986), 2 Can. J. Women & Law
159.
112. Seeforexample, A.M. JohnsonJr., "The New Voice of Color" (1991), 10YaleL.J. 2007;
R. Delgado, "When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter" (1990), 76 Va. L. Rev.
95; N. Duclos, "Lessons of Difference: Feminist Theory on Cultural Diversity", 38 Buffalo
L. Rev. 1; M. Matsuda, "Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in
Plowed-Up Ground" (1988), 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 1; P. J. Williams, "Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights" (1987), 22 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. Lib. L. Rev.
401; K. Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics", 1989 U.
Chicago Leg. Forum 139.
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identity, if such can ever exist, is a product of will, not a common destiny
or a natural birthright. Thus, consciousness is "never fixed, never attained
once and for all"; it is not a final outcome or a biological given, but a
process, a constant contradictory state of becoming, in which both social
institutions and individual wills are deeply implicated 13
Or as Joan Williams put it, "[s]ometimes I feel like a white, sometimes
a heterosexual, sometimes a Jew, sometimes a lawyer, sometimes an
Episcopalian. Often I feel simply like my mother's daughter."" 4 This is
not to say that there is nothing but difference. If the self is a "territorial or
chronological site for cultural interaction",1 5 traditional legal culture is
much narrower than the range of cultural interaction that women, aboriginal
people, minorities, and others can potentially bring to the legal system.
(i) Excluded voices and perspectives
In the discussion that follows, the exclusion of the voices of women and
aboriginal people is emphasized. This is not to say that the voices of other
groups have not been excluded. Menkel-Meadow has speculated about
some other voices that have also been excluded and about the contributions
which such voices might make. For example, the economically
disadvantaged might have stories to tell about law in small claims courts
and about disputes with employers and merchants. The handicapped and
elderly might bring an ethic of helping and interdependence to our legal
system. Homosexuals might bring a welcome challenge to neat legal
categories of human relationships.
11 6
Aboriginal people have many voices and many perspectives. As Mary
Ellen Turpel points out, the differences between Aboriginal andEuropean
cultures are in turn dependent on the varied artifacts, stories and customs
of particular aboriginal peoples. 1 7 Turpel is willing to make some
generalizations: the individual ownership of property is antithetical to the
widely-accepted stewardship responsibilities of aboriginal peoples for
Mother Earth, aboriginal cultures are oral, and social life is based on
responsibilities to creation and the Creator. At least some First Nations
pattern their social life on the Four Directions, or responsibilities: trust,
kindness, sharing and strength. 8 The Manitoba Aboriginal Justice
113. A.P. Harris, "Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory" (1990), 42 Stanford L.
Rev. 581, p. 584.
114. J.C. Williams, "Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modem Path
Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory", [1991] Duke L.J. 296, p. 307.
115. D. Kennedy, "Comments onJamie Boyle's Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory' (1991),
62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 597, p. 597.
116. C. Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 16, p. 50.
117. M.E. Turpel, "Interpretive Monopolies", supra, note 111, p. 29.
118. Id.
490 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Inquiry also recognized the diversity of aboriginal cultures, but identified
four major ethics or rules of behaviour which form the basis for daily
interaction in aboriginal communities: the ethic of non-interference, the
rule of non-competitiveness, emotional restraint and sharing." 9
The argument has been made that women collectively speak with a
different voice. 20 Others have argued that women speak with many
different voices, and that any uniformity is often an illusion imposed by
white feminists:
If we [white feminists] now attempt to maintain the appearance of unifornity
and universality for strategic reasons at the expense of ignoring our own
hegemonicposition and the challenges of, among others, women of color, we
risk irreparable fragmentation. While we should work toward building
solidarity, we cannot pretend union when it does not exist.... Pluralism,
however, will not be sufficient .... It is also important that our diverse voices
be understood to affect one another, to intersect and interact.
121
Much of the argument about a different voice for women begins with
Carol Gilligan' s book, In a Different Voice.122 Gilligan suggests that men
and women respond differently to ethical problems. Gilligan found that
boys dealt with a hypothetical ethical dilemma according to a "logic of
justice", while girls dealt with the same dilemma according to an "ethic
of care". "Jake" reasoned abstractly and considered individuals to be
separated; "Amy" reasoned in terms of relationships. 23 Jake has the
reasoning skill traditionally associated with being a lawyer; Amy does
not. Women's reasoning is devalued because in a world defined by
gender inequality, the male standard is the standard. 24
119. Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, supra, note 89, pp. 29-33. The four ethics or rules
of behaviour were identified by the Mohawk psychiatrist Dr. Clare Brant. Id.
120. See for example C. Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 16.
121. M. Kline, supra, note 110, pp. 147-9.
122. C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
123. Id., pp. 24-63. Gilligan's idea that women have an "ethic of care" goes back at least to
Shakespeare. In The'Merchant of Venice, Portia, disguised as a man, pleads eloquently for
mercy where the others ask only forjustice. See C. Menkel-Meadow, "Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculations on aWomen's Lawyering Process" (1985), 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 39,
p. 42, n. 23.
124. Catharine MacKinnon makes the same point about the maleness of the state:
If objectivity is the epistemological stance of which women's sexual objectification is
the social process, its imposition the paradigm of power in the male form, then the state
appears most relentless in imposing the male point of view when it comes closest to
achieving its highest formal criterion of distanced aperspectivity. When it is most
ruthlessly neutral, it is most male; when it is most sex blind, it is most blind to the sex
of the standard being applied. When it most closely conforms to precedent, to "facts,"
to legislative intent, it most closely enforces socially male norms and most thoroughly
precludes questioning their content as having a point of view at all.
Supra, note 110, p. 248.
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Although Gilligan herself is careful to point out that the identities of
Amy and Jake are not tied exclusively to their genders, some feminist
legal scholars argue that female lawyers speak with Amy's voice and
have her perspective.12 However, the experiences of Gilligan's "Amy"
can be challenged for not reflecting the differences in culture, class,
ethnicity, sexual orientation and so on that characterize women in real
life.'26 Gilligan's work has also been attacked on scientific grounds: one
analysis of sixty separate empirical studies of moral reasoning concluded
that there is in fact no significant difference between the moral reasoning
of men and women. 127 The lack of strong empirical support for Gilligan' s
theory need not impair Amy's usefulness as one example of an excluded
voice. But there are otherwomen' s voices which must also berecognized:
"... we need to acknowledge the importance of 'the woman's ... point
of view' without homogenizing or essentializing its content."
128
(ii) The exclusion of the perspectives of women and aboriginal people
It is possible to document some of the ways in which the perspectives of
women and of aboriginal people have been excluded from the legal
system. There is a considerable literature on the exclusion of women's
voices, and significant evidence from decided Canadian cases of the
exclusion of aboriginal perspectives.
a. The perspectives of women
The experiences of women have traditionally been devalued and excluded
in at least three areas of the legal system. First, some judges have
difficulty overcoming stereotypes about women to understand what
women are saying.129 One striking example comes from the Maryland
state report on gender bias in the courts. A woman was seeking protection
from continuing domestic violence at the hands of her husband. At the
hearing before the judge she had testified that her husband had threatened
to kill her with a gun. The woman paraphrased the judge's response to her
application for protection as follows:
I don't believe anything you're saying .... The reason I don't believe it is
because I don't believe that anything like this could happen to me. If I was
you and someone had threatened me with a gun, there is no way that I
125. For example, M.J. Mossman, supra, note 18, pp. 13-14.
126. D.L. Rhode, "The 'Woman's Point of View" (1988), 38 J. Legal Educ. 39, p. 43.
127. Id.
128. Id., p. 46.
129. K. Czapanskiy, supra, note 57, p. 3.
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would continue to stay with them. There is no way that I could take that
kind of abuse from them. Therefore, since I would not let that happen to
me, I can't believe that it happened to you. 3
The difficulty male judges have in understanding women's experiences
is discussed below in connection with the importance of appointing more
women judges.' 31
The voices of women are also excluded and devalued in the practice of
law. The argument has been made that the different experiences of women
not only give some women qualities which are stereotypically associated
with being female, such as caring and peacemaking, but also other important
qualities such as concern for the indigent and underrepresented, or an
awareness of the importance of social protest. 132 Some writers have argued
that the special experiences of women have the potential to challenge central
tenets of our legal system, including the adversary system. These writers
argue that women's experiences are conducive to such values as consensus,
mediation, contextualization, and negotiation.
Some women may initially adaptto "male" modes of practice, but later
realize that they are uncomfortable with them, or that these modes of
practice are not necessarily the most effective. Menkel-Meadow recounts
how the environment in which she had worked as a trial lawyer for legal
services was a "macho trial" culture. Although she initially felt
uncomfortable with this culture, by the time she left legal services she had
managed to fit in:
I felt excluded by this culture in several ways. First, it was predominantly
male. Second, I found it difficult to be aggressive and confrontational
when I frequently saw some of the other side's problems, such as lack of
funding. Third, I knew that "paper victories" did not solve the underlying
problem.... By apprenticing myself to some hard-hitting lawyers who
taught me the tricks of the trade, I am able to report that when I left legal
services I was regarded by many as a "tough cookie". 33
Menkel-Meadow later realized that the dominant culture of trial practice
was not necessarily the most effective: "the conventions of the club I was
trying to enter were remarkably narrow, short sighted, and could in fact
be demonstrated to be economically and mathematically inefficient."'
34
Menkel-Meadow argues that previously excluded voices such as women's
voices can provide new ideas to counteract the "stagnation and bankruptcy
of the status quo.' 35
130. Id., p. 4.
131. See text at note 183, infra, and following.
132. C. Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 16, p. 39.
133. Id., p. 32.
134. C. Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 16, p. 33.
135. Id., p. 34.
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A similar argument is made by Naomi Cahn. She argues that the
adversarial system and the ethical standards associated with it are
gendered and have a male bias. 36 Cahn suggests that the increasing
numbers of women lawyers of different races, classes and sexual
orientations may inspire alternative visions of the practice of law and of
legal ethics. Cahn argues that feminist models of practice see the lawyer,
the client and the larger social background as linked together in a single
context. Feminist legal practice emphasizes more than the legal problem:
it considers how a legal resolution will affect the client's other
relationships. 3 7 For example, in a child abuse situation where the mother
is seeking custody, Cahn suggests that a feminist lawyer would discuss
with the client the effect her actions will have on the lawyer, on herself
and on her children. Such a contextual approach respects the integrity of
both the lawyer and the client. 3 '
The third area in which women's perspectives have been excluded is
in the development of substantive law. The potentially positive benefits
of women's experiences on the development of the law has been
demonstrated by the work of the Women's Legal Education and Action
Fund (LEAF). Perhaps the most remarkable example of the benefits of
including women's voices in the process of developing the law is the case
of Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,'39 an important Charter
equality rights case. LEAF was an intervenor in the appeal before the
Supreme Court of Canada. 40 LEAF argued that the protection of the
equality rights in s. 15 should only be extended to disadvantaged groups,
in order to prevent powerful groups from using s. 15 to strike down
legislation intended to protect the disadvantaged. LEAF argued that
disadvantage should be measured in terms of "dignity, respect, access to
resources, physical security, credibility, membership in community, or
power."' 4' A similar argument was advanced by the Coalition of Provincial
Organizations for the Handicapped. 42 The LEAF position was different
from those of both the applicant and the respondent. In the result,
McIntyre J. (writing for the majority on this point) substantially adopted
136. N.R. Cahn, "A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics" (1990), 4 Georgetown J.
Leg. Ethics 23.
137. Id., pp. 30, 34-5.
138. Id., pp. 40-41.
139. Andrews, supra, note 4.
140. Id., p. 150.
141. W. Black and L. Smith, "Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia" (1989), 68 Can.
Bar Rev. 591, p. 598.
142. Id.
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the LEAF position. McIntyre J. held that s. 15 rights will generally only
be available to disadvantaged groups; equality rights are available only
in those cases where distinctions involve "prejudice or disadvantage."
143
A good case can be made that the intervention of LEAF at the earliest
stages of the judicial interpretation of s. 15 of the Charter played a
significant part in defining constitutional equality rights in Canada.
b. Aboriginal perspectives
The record of the Canadian judiciary in recognizing the significance of
aboriginal culture is mixed but is arguably improving. Growing public
awareness of aboriginal issues, the entrenchment of aboriginal rights in
s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and increasing numbers of aboriginal
lawyers and judges have all contributed to making the judiciary more
sensitive to aboriginal perspectives. Nonetheless, there remain judges
unwilling or unable to recognize the existence or significance of aboriginal
voices.
Recent examples of willingness on thepart of thejudiciary to recognize
aboriginal perspectives include the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Sparrow. 144 Writing for the Court, Dickson C.J. (as he then
was) and La Forest J. expressly recognized the importance of aboriginal
perspectives in defining the content of aboriginal rights entrenched by s.
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In their words, "it is possible, and,
indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself on the
meaning of the rights at stake."
145
Associate Chief Judge Murray Sinclair, of the Provincial Court of
Manitoba, recently delivered a speech in which he emphasized the
importance of avoiding cultural orethnic bias against aboriginal accused.
146
Judge Sinclair linked cultural bias to gender bias, but noted that very little
has been written on cultural bias:
It is rather surprising to note that there has been little attention given to the
role of cultural or ethnic bias in the justice system .... Gender bias we are
told is bias which arises from our upbringing and develops subliminally -
almost unconsciously. The predominance of men among the judiciary has
fostered continued gender bias we are told and unless we make an effort
to recognize it gender bias can go undetected.... The same is true for
cultural or ethnic bias as well. We must begin to question whether we are
143. Andrews, supra, note 4, p. 181.
144. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
145. Id., p. 1112.
146. Associate Chief Judge Murray Sinclair, "Dealing with the Aboriginal Offender. Indians
and the Criminal Law" (1990), 14 Prov. Judges J. No. 2, 14. The speech was delivered to new
Provincial Court Judges at Val Morin, Qubec, on April 5,.1990.
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able to deliver ourselves to the judicial process free from influences which
are culturally in conflict with the aboriginal accused with whom we deal.
Very little has been written in this area, but what little exists, suggests that
we judges need to do more work.'47
R. v. Naqitarvik48 was a Crown appeal from a sentence of 90 days
imprisonment to be served intermittently and two years' probation
imposed on an Inuit man found guilty of sexual assault. Belzil J.A.,
dissenting, would have upheld the sentence. Belzil J.A. noted that the trial
judge had given "weight to the concerns of the community expressed to
him by its elders . . . and he took into account the unquestioned
effectiveness of its traditional treatment of offenders.' ' 49 Belzil J.A.
discussed the importance of traditional Inuit methods of handling offenders:
... the primary concern of the community had been and still is to maintain
its harmony and cohesiveness, a concern undoubtedly traditionally
considered crucial to the very survival of a small group in a harsh and
isolated environment and now considered crucial to the survival of its
cultural identity in the face of intrusion by a civilization foreign to it.
Imprisonment, even banishment, were historically unknown as forms of
punishment. Imprisonment is viewed not only as destructive of the
accused himself but as containing the seed of disharmony and division and
hence destructive of the community itself. The traditional method of
handling an offender is forced confrontation by the elders even to the point
of denying him food or other amenities until a willingness to change for the
better is manifested, and this is followed by relentless counselling until the
offender is considered rehabilitated. The treatment is shown by the
evidence to have achieved what must be the ultimate purpose of all
punishment for crime, that is to say, protection of the community and
rehabilitation of the offender. It has had the added benefit of effecting
reconciliation between victim and offender, a concept only now being
advanced in our society by some criminologists. 50
Under the circumstances, Belzil J.A. held that the sentence imposed by
the trial judge was appropriate:
The trial judge properly took into account the special circumstances
disclosed in evidence of a small isolated group striving to preserve its
cultural heritage by maintaining its cultural unity, not for the purpose of
blocking the imposition of criminal law but by gradually introducing it by
bridging the gap between traditional law and the new law.'
147. Id., p. 14.
148. (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (N.W.T.C.A.).
149. Id., p. 199.
150. Id., pp. 199-200.
151. Id., p. 206.
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In spite of encouraging signs that judges are willing to recognize the
cultural difference of aboriginal people, there remain many instances
where judges have ignored or devalued the fact of cultural difference. A
notable recent example is the judgment of McEachem C.J.S.C. (as he
then was) in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.152 In giving his reasons for
rejecting the claims of the Gitksan and Wet' suwet' en peoples, McEachern
C.J.S.C. failed to recognize Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en culture as a
culture different from his own. The Chief Justice chose instead to
characterize the aboriginal culture as an instance of an earlier stage of his
own Western culture:
. .. it would not be accurate to assume that even pre-contact existence in
the territory was in the least bit idyllic. The plaintiffs' ancestors had no
written language, no horses or wheeled vehicles, slavery and starvation
were common, and there is no doubt, to quote Hobbs [sic], that aboriginal
life in the territory was, at best, "nasty, brutish and short."' 53
The words of McEachern C.J.S.C. are a remarkable echo of the words of
an earlier B.C. Chief Justice, Davey C.J.B.C., in Calder v. British
Columbia (A.G.). 154 In that case, Davey C.J.B.C. characterized the
aboriginal Nishga people at the time of settlement as "a very primitive
people with few of the institutions of civilized society."'1 55
Another instance ofjudicial inability to appreciate the cultural difference
of aboriginal society is found in the judgments of Forsyth J. and of
Kierans J.A. in Ominayak v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.,'15 6 refusing
an application for an interim injunction by the Lubicon Lake Cree to halt
oil and gas exploration. One commentary on the judgments emphasized
the unwillingness of thejudicial system to come to terms with aboriginal
culture:
I believe the courts failed to understand the nature of hunting and trapping
societies and lacked the will to accept the evidence put forth by the Cree.
For thejudges, and the defendant lawyers, it was the first time they had had
direct contact with native people. The language barriers were considerable
since not only was English used entirely but it was used in a legalistic way.
The Cree elders spoke no English and it fell to the chief to interpret not only
what was said but what it meant. The differential views of justice, of truth,
of morality were painfully clear in this cross-cultural situation.'57
152. (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.).
153. Id., p. 208.
154. (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 64 (B.C.C.A.).
155. Id., p. 66.
156. (1983), 29 Aita. L.R. (2d) 151 (Q.B.), aff'd (1984), 36 Alta. L.R, (2d) 137 (C.A.).
157. J. Ryan and B. Ominayak, "The Cultural Effects ofJudicial Bias", in S.L. Martin and K.E.
Mahoney, eds., Equality andJudicialNeutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), pp. 346:57, p. 3 5 7 .
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III. Towards a response
If discrimination is endemic in the legal profession, what measures can
be taken to reduce discrimination? A successful strategy will operate on
a number of fronts simultaneously. Education of judges and lawyers, in
continuing education programs and in law school, will be an important
aspect of such a strategy. Equally important will be an effort by the legal
profession to increase the participation of historically excluded groups in
all aspects of the legal system, and to recognize the existence and value
of the experiences and perspectives of such groups. As I will argue, a
strategy to reduce discrimination in the legal profession should also
include the recognition of a duty of non-discrimination for legal
professionals.
1. Education
Educational initiatives will be crucial to reducing discrimination. To be
effective, educational programs should begin in law schools and be an
integral part of bar admission and continuing education curricula. Such
programs should teach law students, lawyers and judges about
discrimination and sensitize them to different perspectives. Over the long
term, education will reduce the need for other initiatives, such as
affirmative measures to increase diversity within the legal profession, or
disciplinary action against legal professionals who discriminate.
Integral to educational programs will be a commitment to opening the
legal profession to people with different perspectives, because neither the
effects of discrimination, nor the benefits that come from diversity, can
be appreciated and understood without the active participation of those
who have previously been excluded. Difference is something which must
be experienced to be understood: as one writer phrases it, difference is the
"irreconcilable or irreducible elements of human relationships"
15 8
Education will help lawyers and judges to recognize difference.
59
Understanding cultural difference is necessarily dialogic. Judge Sinclair
suggests one example of such a dialogue, in the context of the treatment
of aboriginal people by the criminal justice system. Judge Sinclair argues
that aboriginal communities must be included as actors in the criminal
justice system. There should be aboriginal sentencing advisory panels,
and court sittings in aboriginal communities. There should be a devolution
of some of the functions currently performed by the courts on aboriginal
158. M.E. Turpel, "Interpretive Monopolies", supra, note 111, p. 13.
159. Id., p. 24.
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communities. 60 There will doubtless be other circumstances where such
a partnership between the legal profession and a cultural community will
be appropriate.
Law schools should make discrimination, and analysis of the
disadvantages facing women, aboriginal persons and minorities a central
issue in their curricula. 16 1 Alternate voices belonging to traditionally
excluded groups must be allowed to take their place in shaping a diverse
and pluralistic legal culture. Innovative teaching methods, including the
use of simulations to explore the issues, are called for.'62 The Special
Advisory Committee to the Canadian Association of Law Teachers
suggested that the elimination of discrimination should be seen as:
... along term project that is central to the legitimacy of the very enterprise
of legal education. It is about the social relevance of law. And it is about
the moral and professional legitimacy of lawyers and the legal profession
in society. 163
Dalhousie Law School recently implemented a program for indigenous
and black students: the "Indigenous Blacks and Micmacs" program.164 In
this respect, Dalhousie Law School joins other Canadian law schools
with similar programs, including the University of British Columbia
Faculty of Law and the College of Law at the University of Saskatchewan.
Law firms should also have programs to educate lawyers and support
staff about discrimination. Issues of sexual harassment should figure
prominently in such programs. Firms should develop specific policies on
sexual harassment clearly stating that sexual misconduct is not
permissible. 165 Law firms should also consider cross-cultural education
programs to develop a critical awareness of cultural difference. Similar
initiatives should be considered in continuing legal education programs.
Judicial education programs are of equal importance. The Canadian
judiciary has been active in establishing educational programs to eliminate
discrimination by judges, although these programs have tended to
emphasize gender discrimination. In 1989, the Canadian Judicial Council
160. Sinclair, A.C.J.M., supra, note 146, pp. 18-19.
161. See D.L. Rhode, supra, note 126, p. 1205.
162. S. Scarnecchia, "Gender & Race Bias Against Lawyers: A Classroom Response" (1990),
23 J. Law Ref. 319.
163. Special Advisory Committee to the Canadian Association of Law Teachers, supra, note
12, p. 7.
164. See generally, H. MacAulay, "Improving Access to Legal Education for Native People
in Canada: Dalhousie Law School's I.B.M. Program in Context" (1991), 14 Dalhousie L.J.
133.
165. J. Meier, "Sexual Harassment in Law Finns: Should Attorneys be Disciplined under the
Lawyer Codes" (1990), 4 Georgetown J. Leg. Ethics 169, p. 188.
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held seminars for judges on "Judicial Discretion: Eliminating Gender
Myths in the Courtroom" in Nova Scotia and Alberta. The background
paper to the Alberta seminar described the seminar's objectives as
follows:
We have decided to put on the agenda a variety of gender based myths
which affect the way women are treated under our legal system. Each of
these myths relates to a discreet area of the law and would deserve fuller
analysis than is possible in a short seminar session. However, we have
chosen to explore a wider range of issues in the hope that we can draw on
the varied experience of the participants who are confronted with sexual
stereotypes in many different ways.
1 66
Gender issues were also included in the 1990 summer seminars for judges
organized by the Canadian Judicial Council; there are plans to present the
same program in more locations across the country and to make the
materials available to all Canadian judges. 67
The Judicial Independence Committee of the Canadian Judicial Council
has produced a book, Commentaries on Judicial Conduct,16 1 which
examines ethical issues faced by judges, including the issue of "gender
neutrality". In the foreword to the book, Chief Justice Lamer, the
Chairman [sic] of the Canadian Judicial Council, describes the purpose
of the book as being to, "help judges to think about how their actions and
reactions might be perceived by their fellow judges, by the parties before
them in court, and by the public generally." 169 The Judicial Independence
Committee recognizes that discrimination against women still occurs
within court systems: "Judicial attitudes and values derived from the past,
which denigrate the role of women in society are still present in the court
systems and in the law which they administer."' 170 Unfortunately, the
discussion of discrimination on the basis of gender is largely confined to
the appropriateness of addressing counsel and witnesses in gender-neutral
language.'
7 1
166. Canadian Judicial Council, JudicialDiscretion: Eliminating Gender Myths in the Courts
(1989 Superior Court Judges Seminar, Calgary, Alberta), [preface].
167. Madame Justice Wilson, "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?" (1990), 28
Osgoode Hall L.J. 507, p. 517.
168. Canadian Judicial Council, Commentaries on Judicial Conduct (Cowansville, Qubec:
Les tditions Yvon Blais Inc., 1991).
169. Id., p. VIII. Lamer C.J.C. is identified as the "Chairman" of the Judicial Council: id.,
p. IX.
170. Id., p. 90.
171. Id., pp. 88-91.
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Apart from the work of the Canadian Judicial Council, there have been
several other recent judicial education initiatives in the area of gender
equality. The Western Judicial Education Centre has sponsored seminars
on gender bias and on aboriginal issues.172 In May 1990, Federal/
Provincial/Territorial working groups were established on gender equality
issues. A working symposium on gender equality and the Canadian
justice system was sponsored by the Federal Department of Justice in
June of 1991.173
In the United States, there is a national program to educate thejudiciary
about discrimination on the basis of gender. The National Judicial
Education Program (NJEP) not only teaches judges to be aware of their
own behaviour, but teaches them strategies for ensuring that no person in
their courtrooms discriminates on the basis of gender.74 The goal of the
course is "to make judges aware of what kind of conduct expresses bias,
what the consequences of this conduct are, and how intervention can be
accomplished without prejudicing the case."'175 The course has been
well-received by judges; a common evaluation received from judges is
that "your presentation made us focus on a problem that most of us
assumedto be nonexistent."176 Other Americanjudicial educationprograms
have made innovative use of role-playing exercises and videotapes.
177
Although educational programs for judges focusing on gender
discrimination are important, educational programs for judges should be
expanded in scope, to cover discrimination on grounds other than gender.
Such programs might cover discrimination on grounds of race, economic
class, handicap, and sexual orientation. Equally important, educational
programs should sensitize judges to cultural difference. Judge Sinclair
suggests that judges should sensitize themselves to aboriginal cultures:
... let us establish and maintain ongoing cross-cultural awareness that
benefit[s] both our judges and the aboriginal comnunities where our
judges have influence. This means going to the land of the aboriginal
people, seeing how their communities function and how we influence what
goes on. In addition, we should attend where possible, tribal gatherings and
functions.
78
172.M.G.Brown, GenderEqualityin the Courts: Criminal Law (Ottawa:National Association
of Women and the Law, 1991), p. 1-19.
173. Id., p. (ii)-(iii).
174. The program does not deal with issues of discrimiriation on grounds other than gender.
N.J. Wikler, supra, note 64, p. 208.
175. L.H. Schafran, supra, note 55, p. 76.
176. L.H. Schafran, director of NJEP, quoted in J.A. Levine, supra, note 68.
177. L.H. Schafran, supra, noie 55, pp. 75-76.
178. Sinclair, A.C.J.M., "Presentation" (May 14, 1990), on file with the author.
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The importance of cross-cultural educational programs was emphasized
by the Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry. The Inquiry found that some
of the discrimination experienced by aboriginal people in Manitoba
resulted from "widespread misconceptions about Aboriginal people and
about their perception of the law and the legal system."' 79 The Report of
the Inquiry recommended cross-cultural training for all in the justice
system who come into contact with aboriginal people:
We recommend that: Federal, provincial and municipal governments,
individually or in concert, with the assistance and involvement of Aboriginal
people, establish formal cross-cultural educational programs for all those
working in any part of thejustice system who have even occasional contact
with Aboriginal people. 8 '
2. A commitment to diversity in the legal community
A commitment to ending discrimination must also include a commitment
to recognize and to value perspectives which have previously been
excluded. Such a commitment should extend to the perspectives of
traditionally excluded groups. The legal profession should celebrate
difference and diversity:
... our common exclusions may enable us to see that there is a vision of
equality that does not require sameness, that there is a glory in diversity and
difference, and that there are ways for the law to include, accommodate,
and rejoice in the social and cultural differences that both enrich our
society as well as threaten to divide it.'8'
Different perspectives will conie into the legal profession as more
lawyers and judges come from previously excluded groups. The presence
of previously excluded groups in the profession will bring about some
welcome changes. Lawyers will be less likely to discriminate against
women, aboriginal persons, homosexuals, or other historically
disadvantaged groups if they regularly deal with members of these groups
in a professional context. 82 Increasing the representation of excluded
groups in the judiciary will reduce discrimination by judges, and may also
result in positive changes to the substance of the law.
179. Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, supra, note 89, p. 660.
180. Id., p. 661.
181. C. Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 16, p. 50.
182. One American study apparently confirmed this principle. The study found that reading
about successful women in a particular occupation made participants in the study more likely
to hire a woman in a related occupation. K. Donovan, supra, note 32, p. 140.
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The issue of diversity in the legal profession has received considerable
attention in the context of the desirability of having more female judges.
There are a number of reasons to favour a bench with greater female
representation. According to the U.S. state task forces, womenjudges are
more likely to intervene to stop discrimination, at least if the discrimination
is on the basis of sex."8 3 The argument that there should be more female
judges has also been made by female judges themselves. Former Justice
Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada suggests that "the mere fact that
women are judges serves an educative function and helps to shatter
stereotypes about the role of women in society that are held by male
judges and lawyers as well as by litigants, jurors and witnesses."'18 4
Christine Boyle takes the argument further by calling for more
specifically feminist judges.'85 Feminist judges could utilize their
knowledge about ways in which women and men experience the world
to ensure that their decisions did not only protect male interests. Boyle
argues that feminist judges would be better able to try cases of sexual
assault against women. Feminist judges (including male judges capable
of adopting a feminist perspective) would take women's interests into
account. They "would actively incorporate a different world view into
[their] decision making."' 6 A feminist judge would arrive at a different
understanding of sexual assault. Because many feminists understand
mainstream sexuality as the eroticization of male dominance, such a
judge would better understand that a man beating a woman commits a
sexual assault. Because judges must finally rely on their own intuitions
and experience of what is sexual, a "feminist judge would have the best
sense possible of when a woman would experience... touching... to be
sexual."'8
7
Like Boyle, former Justice Wilson argues that the presence of more
female judges will result in substantive changes to the law. Women
judges may be more willing to delve into the circumstances of a case, to
broaden the context of the dispute, "to show the issue in a larger
183. See text accompanying note 59, supra.
184. The Honourable B. Wilson, supra, note 167, p. 517, quoting S. Sherry, "The Gender of
Judges" (1986) 4 Law and Inequality 159, p. 160.
185. C. Boyle, "Sexual Assault and the Feminist Judge" (1985), 1 Can. J. Women & L. 93.
Boyle argues thatfeminist judges, whether male or female, would be better able to try cases of
sexual assault. However, Boyle relies in her argument on the affinity in life experience between
the judge and the victim, effectively conceding that a female judge will have access to insights
unavailable to a male judge.
186. Id., p. 103.
187. Id., pp. 105-6.
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perspective or as impacting on other groups not directly involved in the
litigation at all." '88 As a result, there are areas where the perspective that
women judges bring will result in changes to substantive law:
In some... areas of the law, however, a distinctively male perspective is
clearly discernible. It has resulted in legal principles that are not
fundamentally sound and should be revisited when the opportunity presents
itself.... Some aspects of the criminal law in particular cry out for change
since they are based on presuppositions about the nature of women and
women's sexuality that in this day and age, are little short of ludicrous. 189
The recent case of Lavallee v. The Queen'90 provides some support for
former Justice Wilson's contention that women judges will be more
receptive to women's voices and that substantive changes to the law may
result. Angelique Lyn Lavallee was charged with murder after shooting
her common-law husband in the back of the head. Writing for the majority
of the Supreme Court, Wilson 1. held that expert testimony as to the effect
of the "battered wife syndrome" on the accused was admissible. In
holding such evidence admissible, Wilson J. emphasized the importance
of dispelling stereotypes about abused women held by members of the
public:
Expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and
common law partners must, it seems to me, be both relevant and necessary
in the context of the present case. How can the mental state of the appellant
be appreciated without it? The average member of the public (or of the
jury) can be forgiven for asking: Why would a woman put up with this kind
of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could
she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization?
We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her
self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself?
Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called
"battered wife syndrome."''
Justice Wilson goes on to note that the standard of the "ordinary man", so
well known to the law, is inappropriate in the case of battered women:
If it strains credibility to imagine what the "ordinary man" would do in the
position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not typically
find themselves in that situation. Some women do, however. The definition
of what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances which are, by and
large, foreign to the world inhabited by the hypothetical "reasonable
man',. 92
188. The Honourable B. Wilson, supra, note 167, p. 521.
189. Id., p. 515.
190. Supra, note 74.
191. Id., pp. 871-72.
192. Id., p. 874.
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The legal community is beginning to experience some of the changes
that greater numbers of women lawyers will bring to the profession. I
discussed the contribution which the perspectives of women might make
to the practice of law above.'93 Some indication of the kinds of changes
which might come to law firms through incorporating women's
perspectives can be found in the practice of all-women law firms. In
general, such firms are organized in egalitarian and non-hierarchical
ways, and emphasize participatory decision making. 9 4 We can expect
that the impact of women's perspectives on law practice will be positive:
What are the ways in which women might affect the practice and content
of the law? Let me suggest a few: Women may force us to have a more
sincere concern for the quality of our work, our personal lives, and our
relationship to each other so that unnecessary hard work will not interfere
with important human relationships .... Women may help us to appreciate
the purpose, meaning, and effects of the product of our work and to become
sincerely committed to work toward what we think is best in our work and
world. Women lawyers may provide us with ways of practising law that
are less combative and dehumanizing, less damaging to others and
ourselves.'95
Increasing numbers of women practising law may force law firms to
develop more innovative programs for lawyers and support staff wishing
to raise children. Successful policies will permit accommodation of work
and family demands by both men and women. The details of such policies
are beyond the scope of this paper, but one likely element will be greater
opportunities for-part-time work for lawyers. Allowing lawyers to work
at home is another option. Greater support for childcare and other back-up
services by law firms will also be an essential element of any successful
policy.
196
The importance of greater numbers of aboriginal lawyers, judges,
police officers and court workers in the criminal justice system was
recognized by the Manitoba Aboriginal Justice Inquiry. In its Report, the
Inquiry concluded that one result of greater aboriginal representation
would be a better understanding of the problems faced by aboriginal
accused:
One of the problems is that there are almost no Aboriginal people in the
• system to whom [Aboriginal accused] can turn for assistance or advice.
Other than some police officers or band constables, there are few, if any,
Aboriginal people employed by the legal system resident in Aboriginal
193. See text accompanying note 132, supra, and following.
194. C. Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 33, pp. 199-200.
195. Id., p. 202.
196. D.L. Rhode, supra, note 126, p. 1206.
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communities.... We are satisfied that if there were Aboriginal people
working in the legal system, there would be a greater understanding of the
problems faced by Aboriginal accused, victims, witnesses and their
families, and higherlevels of assistance and advice. Aboriginal communities
would benefit economically and socially from having people within their
community who hold positions of importance within the justice system.
197
3. Codes of professional conduct
Codes of professional conduct can play a variety of roles in any strategy
to reduce discrimination in the legal profession. One possibility is to leave
the promotion of non-discrimination to the private ethical standards of
legal professionals, and to provincial, federal and constitutional human
rights standards that affect lawyers and non-lawyers equally. Such an
approach is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, given the weight of the
evidence that discrimination does exist in the legal profession, it is
evident that the ethical standards of individual lawyers are not presently
sufficient to remove discrimination from the legal profession.' Second,
and perhaps more important, as the curators of the administration of
justice, the legal profession should be taking a leading role in reducing
discrimination. The legal profession enjoys the privilege of being
-autonomous and self-regulating; with that privilege comes the
responsibility to set a high standard of professional conduct for its
members. As the Canadian Bar Association has recognized in its Code of
Professional Conduct, a lawyer has, as a result of his or her professional
position, a responsibility to encourage respect for the administration of
justice:
[A] lawyer should encourage public respect for and try to improve the
administration of justice.... The obligation.., is not restricted to the
lawyer's professional activities but is a general responsibility resulting
from the lawyer's position in the community. The lawyer's responsibilities
are greater than those of a private citizen. 8
Incorporating a duty of non-discrimination into codes of professional
conduct addresses both of these concerns.
To be effective, a professional duty of non-discrimination must be
specific enough to be enforceable, but general enough to be applicable in
a wide range of contexts. At a minimum, a duty of non-discrimination
should include a duty not to discriminate against other legal professionals,
witnesses, jurors, or employees. Such a duty should also extend to
197. Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, supra, note 89, p. 663.
198. Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: The Canadian Bar
Association, 1987), p. 59.
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recognizing and valuing other perspectives and experiences. The focus of
the duty should not be on mere discourtesy; the duty must be directed to
the underlying stereotypes which are ingrained in the profession. 99
A professional duty of non-discrimination should also extend to
judges. Judges should be required, as a matter of professional ethics, to
intervene actively to stop discrimination and harassment in their
courtrooms. The purpose of such interventions is not only to protect the
victim, whether lawyer or witness, but also to protect the dignity of the
court and the administration ofjustice. 200 The duty of non-discrimination
should extend to discriminatory behaviour by judges themselves. And
where judges discriminate or harass, those who are the subjects of the
discrimination should have effective remedies available to them. A
person who has been treated in a discriminatory fashion by judge should
be able to initiate disciplinary action against the judge.
I will begin by reviewing the American case law which reads a limited
duty of non-discrimination into general provisions in codes of professional
responsibility. This duty of non-discrimination is essentially a duty of
non-harassment. Many of the provisions that are being interpreted in this
way in the U.S. are similar to provisions found in many Canadian codes
of professional responsibility. I will go on to look at examples of specific
American code provisions that create a professional duty of
non-discrimination. Finally, I will consider the implications of the
American experience for Canadian codes of professional conduct.
(i) Interpreting general code of professional conduct provisions
The potential exists to interpret general professional code provisions to
include a duty of non-discrimination. What follows is a survey of those
Canadian and American professional code provisions which have been
interpreted to include a duty of non-discrimination.201 These provisions
fall into three categories: duties to act with integrity, duties to uphold the
199. K. Koustensis, supra, note 70.
200. See L.H. Schafran, supra, note 55, p. 73. Schafran gives an example of one such effective
intervention, by Judge Clarice Jobes. Despite a previous warning, a male lawyer said to a
female witness, in a demeaning tone, "You don't mind if I call you by your first name, do you
Margaret?" Schafran continues the story:
Judge Jobes immediately said to the witness, "Don't even answer that," and to the
lawyer, "I mind. I've told you before not to do this. Call her by her last name, as you do
with all the male witnesses."
Id., p. 74 (from an interview by Schafran on Apr. 4, 1984).
201. It should be noted that while more recent codes of professional conduct use gender-neutral
language, the older codes do not.
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administration of justice, and duties of courtesy and good faith towards
other lawyers.
The American Bar Association has produced two professional conduct
codes: the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("ABA
Model Code"),2 2 and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("ABA Model Rules"). 23 In August 1983, the ABA replaced the Model
Code with the Model Rules, and most American states now have ethical
codes based on the ABA Model Rules. However, because the Model
Code contains provisions similar to those in Canadian codes of professional
conduct, the cases which have interpreted the provisions of the ABA
Model Code remain relevant in Canada.
a. The duty to act with integrity
Chapter I of the Canadian Bar Association Code ofProfessional Conduct
("CBA Code") provides that "[t]he lawyer must discharge with integrity
all duties owed to clients, the court, other members of the profession and
the public.' '20 4 Chapter 2 of the proposed new British Columbia
Professional Conduct Handbook ("proposed B.C. Handbook") 2 5 is
identical to Chapter I of the CBA Code. Section 3.02.01 of the Quebec
Code of ethics of advocates ("Quebec Code") has a similar provision:
"[t]he advocate must carry out his professional duties with integrity."2°
The provision in the Nova Scotia Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct
Handbook ("N.S. Handbook") is more specific. Chapter 1 provides that:
A lawyer has a duty to discharge with integrity (a) every duty the lawyer
owes to (i) a client, (ii) another lawyer, (iii) a court, (iv) the profession, or
(v) the general public; and (b) every duty the lawyer has to uphold justice
and to uphold and improve the administration of justice.
207
202. American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("ABA Model
Code") (1983), in ABAIBNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct (Washington:
American Bar Association and The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1990), pp. 01:301-347.
203. ABA Model Rules, id., pp. 01:101-175.
204. CBA Code, supra, note 198, p. 1.
205. Law Society of British Columbia, Handbook Revision Committee, Proposed New
Professional Conduct Handbook (June 29, 1990), p. 3. The proposed B.C. Handbook is
modelled on the CBA Code. It will replace the present B.C. Professional Conduct Handbook,
which was first published in 1970.
206. Code of ethics of advocates, R.R.Q. 1981, c. B-1, r. 1, s. 3.02.01. The section includes a
list of 12 specific instances of conduct which violates the advocates obligation to carry out her
duties with integrity. None have any obvious direct bearing on a duty not to discriminate.
207. Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, LegalEthics andProfessional Conduct:AHandbookfor
Lawyers in Nova Scotia (Halifax: "The Printer", for the N.S. Barrister's Society, 1990), p. 1.
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There is no exact equivalent to these duties of integrity in the ABA
Model Code. Canon 1 of the ABA Model Code provides that "a lawyer
should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal
profession."2 s Two disciplinary rules are relevant. Disciplinary Rule
("DR") 1-102(A)(3) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not... [e]ngage in
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude."2 9 At least one U.S. court has
found that sexual harassment is a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3). In one
case, a lawyer was disciplined for sexually harassing a client. The lawyer
"grabbed [the client], kissing her and raising her blouse. '210 In approving
the agreement between the Disciplinary Commission and the lawyer that
he should bepublicly reprimanded, the Indiana Supreme Court emphasized
the fact that the lawyer had sought to exploit the lawyer-clientrelationship:
It should be obvious that [he] sought to exploit the attorney-client
relationship for his own personal physical pleasure. Conduct of this ilk is
particularly repugnant while the client is dependent upon the attorney for
guidance and assistance.
21'
Although the issue was not raised in the short judgment in Adams, it
would appear that the lawyer's conduct was "illegal conduct", as required
by DR 1-102(A)(3), because of Title VII of the CivilRightsAct of 1964.212
Title VII is a remedial statute prohibiting disparate treatment of men and
women in employment.213 In a similar case, the Supreme Court of
Missouri, en banc, held that an attorney who made sexual advances
toward his client violated DR 10-102(A)(3). The court emphasized that
the attorney had exploited the professional relationship for personal ends:
Respondent [the attorney] and Weibel [the client] entered into a professional
relationship. Weibel had a right to expect that respondent would conduct
himself in that relationship in a manner consistent with the honourable
tradition of the legal profession - a tradition founded on service, integrity,
vigorous commitment to the client's best interests, and an allegiance to the
rule of law. Instead of remaining true to that tradition, however, respondent
chose to exploit it, seeking to turn the professional relationship into a
personal one. . . .. -We find the respondent's conduct violated DR
1-102(A)(3).
214
208. ABA Model Code, supra, note 202, p. 01:302.
209. Id., p. 01:303.
210. In reAdams, 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind. 1981).
211. Id. See also G.G Sarno, "Sexual Misconduct as a Ground for Disciplining Attorney or
Judge" (1986), 43 ALR4th 1062.
212.42 U.S.C.A. 2000e.
213. J. Meier, supra, note 165, p. 171.
214. In Re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 773 (Mo.banc 1986), p. 776.
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DR 1-102(A)(6) of the ABA Model Code states that: "[a] lawyer shall
not... [e]ngage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law."215 Lawyers have been disciplined under DR 1-102(A) (6)
for sexually harassing female clients and employees. 21 6 DR 1-102(A)(6)
was interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re Peters.217
Geoffrey Peters, the dean of William Mitchell College of Law, was found
to have repeatedly sexually harassed four women employees, two of
whom were law students. Peters rubbed his body against the four women,
and made sexual comments to them. The court found that Peters' actions
were unlawful under Title VII, and publicly reprimanded him. The court
adopted a wide view of the scope of the circumstances under which
lawyers could be disciplined by the court:
[Peter's assertion that] the conduct did not occur while [he] was acting in
a professional capacity because it did not arise out of an attorney-client
relationship ... demonstrate[s] [his] lack of appreciation of his broader
responsibilities as an attorney/law school dean and of this court's supervisory
function with regard to all aspects of the practice of law.
218
b. Administration ofjustice
Chapter XII of the CBA Code provides that "[t]he lawyer should
encourage public respect for and try to improve the administration of
justice. '219 Chapter 14 of the proposed B.C. Handbook uses identical
language. 220 Chapter 21 of the N.S. Handbook has a similar requirement,
but makes it a lawyer's duty to encourage respect for the administration
of justice. 21 The guiding principles explain that "[the admission to and
continuance in the practice of law imply a basic commitment by the
lawyer to the concept of equal justice for all within an open, ordered and
impartial system."222 Canon 1 of the ABA Mode Code contains a similar
provision. DR 1-102(A)(5) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not ...
[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice .... -11223 Rule 8.4(d) of the ABA Model Rules provides that "[ilt is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct that is
215. ABA Model Code, supra, note 202, p. 01:303.
216. J. Meier, supra, note 165, pp. 183-86.
217. In re Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1988). See also Matter of Discipline ofBergren, 455
N.W.2d 856 (S.D. 1990).
218. Id., p. 382.
219. CBA Code, supra, note 198, p. 59.
220. Proposed B.C. Handbook, supra, note 205, p. 78.
221. N.S. Handbook, supra, note 207, p. 93: "The lawyerhas a duty to encourage public respect
for justice and to uphold and try to improve the administration of justice."
222. Id.
223. ABA Model Code, supra, note 202, p. 01:303.
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prejudicial to the adninistration of justice... ."224 The Quebec Code
contains a somewhat narrower requirement in s. 2.05: "[t]he advocate
must avoid any procedure of a purely dilatory nature and co-operate with
his colleagues to ensure the proper administration of justice.
' 2
25
There is U.S. case law interpreting the obligation to uphold the
administration of justice as including an obligation not to sexually harass
a client. In In re Liebowitz, 226 a New Jersey court held that a lawyer who
forced an indigent client to touch his genital area violated DR 1-102(A) (5)
of the ABA Model Code. The findings of the disciplinary board, which
were approved by the Court, were that the lawyer's conduct was prejudicial
to the administration of justice:
... the board concludes that Respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5) by
engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.
By taking sexual advantage of an assigned client, Respondent brought the
pro bono matrimonial counsel program into disrepute? 7
More generally, interpreting the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
discriminatory practices in jury selection had the effect of undermining
"public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. '22 The
provision in the ABA Model Rules parallel to that in the Model Code has
been held to prohibit invidious discrimination by lawyers, including
racial harassment by lawyers of opposing counsel in court. In one case,
the court found that Rule 8.4(d) prohibited invidious discrimination on
the basis of race or gender:
[T]his kind of harassment is particularly intolerable. Any kind of conduct
or verbal oppression or intimidation that projects offensive and invidious
discriminatory distinctions, be it based on race or color, as in this case, or,
in other contexts on gender, or ethnic or national background or handicap,
is especially offensive. In the context of either the practice of law or the
administration ofjustice, prejudice both to the standing of the profession
and the administration ofjustice will be virtually conclusive if intimidation,
abuse, harassment, or threats focus or dwell on invidious discriminatory
distinctions.22 9
224. ABA Model Rules, supra, note 203, p. 01:174.
225. Quebec Code, supra, note 206.
226. 516 A.2d 246 (N.J. 1985).
227. Id., p. 249.
228. Batson v. Kentucky, supra, note 104, p. 87.
229. In re Vincenti, supra, note 104, p. 474 .
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The lawyer was suspended for three months.2?0
In Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial PerformanceuI the Supreme
Court of California (In Bank) interpreted a provision of the California
Rules of Court making it an offence for a judge to engage in "conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office
into disrepute. ''1 32 The Court found that ethnic slurs by Judge Gonzalez
were such as to constitute a violation of the Rules:
As ajudge he is charged with the obligation to conduct himself at all times
in amannerthat promotes public confidence and esteem forthejudiciary....
[S]uch facially blatant ethnic slurs as those Judge Gonzalez uttered from
the bench are apt to offend minority members ... and may be construed
by the public at large as highly demeaning to minorities.... The ethnic
slurs uttered from the bench constitute unjudicial conduct by ajudge acting
in his personal capacity and are therefore sanctionable as wilful
misconduct.233
In Kennick v. Com 'n on Judicial Performance,2 34 the Supreme Court
of California (In Bank) held that conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice included addressing female attorneys as "sweetheart". The
court also found that such conduct violated Canon 3 A(3) of the California
Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to be "patient, dignified,
and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with
whom judges deal in their official capacity":
Three attorneys, plus a deputy clerk and a police detective, all women,
testified that petitioner had addressed them as "sweetheart," "sweetie," or
"baby"; three of these witnesses stated that petitioner had also addressed
female defendants as "sweetheart" or "sweetie."... We agree with the
commission that petitioner's use of these terms in addressing women
under these circumstances was unprofessional, demeaning and sexist, and
violated Canon 3 A(3) of the California Code of Judicial Conduct .... We
therefore adopt the conclusions of the masters and the commission that
these acts constituted prejudicial conduct.
235
There has been no U.S. case law extending the obligation of a lawyer
not to engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice to
cover non-discrimination in the selection ofjurors, in spite of the obvious
ethical implications, and in spite of years of constitutional litigation over
the issue. EC 7-10 of the ABA Model Code, which obliges a lawyer to
230. Id., p. 476.
231. 188 CaI.Rptr.880 (Sup. 1983)
232. Id., p. 881.
233. Id., p. 890.
234.267 Cal.Rptr. 293 (Cal. 1990).
235. Id., p. 307.
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treat jurors with respect, would appear on its face to be relevant to the
issue.236 EC 7-10 provides that "[t]he duty of a lawyer to represent his
client with zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat
with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid
the infliction of needless harm. '237 One commentator has suggested that
the explanation for the silence of the codes concerning racial strategy
choices is the unwillingness of the profession to admit that lawyers rely
on racial stereotypes:
By remaining silent, our profession's ethical codes downplay the
significance of the practice. Lawyers can quietly acknowledge the practice,
but the public is not privy to this trade secret.25
c. Courtesy and good faith towards other lawyers
Chapter XVI of the CBA Code provides that "[tihe lawyer's conduct
towards other lawyers should be characterized by courtesy and good
faith. '239 Chapter 17 of the proposed B.C. Handbook is in essence
identical to the CBA Code provision.240 Chapter 13 of the N.S. Handbook
similarly provides that "[a] lawyer has a duty to treat and deal with other
lawyers courteously and in good faith."241 The Quebec Code includes in
s. 4.03.03 the requirement that "an advocate shall not abuse a colleague's
good faith or be guilty of breach of trust or disloyal practices towards
him."242 Although there are no specific provisions in the ABA Model
Code or Model Rules regulating behaviour between opposing counsel at
trial, there are general provisions which courts have interpreted as
governing relations between lawyers. DR 7-106(C) (5) of the Model Code
reads: "[i]n appearing in his, professional capacity before a tribunal a
lawyer shall not... [f] ail to comply with known local customs of courtesy
or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing
counsel timely notice of his intent not to comply. '243 DR 7-106(C)(6)
reads: "[in appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a
lawyer shall not ... [e]ngage in undignified or discourteous conduct
which is degrading to a tribunal."244 The ABA Model Code also contains
236. T. Kaine, supra, note 97.
237. ABA Model Code, supra, note 202, p. 01:333.
238. T. Kaine, supra, note 97, p. 382.
239. CBA Code, supra, note 198, p. 69.
240. Proposed B.C. Handbook, supra, note 205, p. 94. The only difference is that in the
proposed B.C. Handbook, the word "member" is used in place of the word "lawyer".
241. N.S. Handbook, supra, note 207, p. 57.
242. Quebec Code, supra, note 206, s. 4.03.03.
243. ABA Model Code, supra, note 202, p. 01:340.
244. Id., p. 01:340.
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non-binding ethical consideration EC 7-38: "[a] lawyer should be courteous
to opposing counsel.. ."245 Although the ABA Model Rules contain a
preambular statement that lawyers "should demonstrate respect for...
other lawyers,' 246 there is no substantive provision to the same effect.
American courts have read the provisions of the ABA Model Code
jointly to require a standard of good faith and fair dealing between
lawyers.2 47 The U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, found that the effect
of the provisions was that "the open forum which our courts provide for
conflict resolution is not, nor can it ever be, a license to slander and abuse
one's adversary.... Lawyers, as officers of the court, must always be
alert to the rule that zealous advocacy on behalf of the client can never
excuse contumacious or disrespectful conduct".24 8 The conduct in question
in that case included a comment by one lawyer to another that "[y]ou
couldn't shine my father's shoes, you Goddamn bootblack." 249 American
courts have also read provisions requiring lawyers not to engage in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice as creating a duty of
respect between opposing counsel. In one case a court applying the ABA
Model Code read DR 1-102(A)(5) (duty not to engage in conduct
"prejudicial to the administration ofjustice") together with DR 1-102(A)(6)
(duty not to engage in "other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law") and EC 7-37 (no "unfair or derogatory personal
references to opposing counsel")210 to discipline a lawyer who attempted
to intimidate his opponents2 1 In that case, the lawyer called another
attorney, "a little yellow son-of-a-bitch" during the course of taking a
deposition. While that conduct was not actionable because it occurred
before the Code of Professional Responsibility became effective, the
lawyer made "direct, personal, insulting references directed towards
opposing counsel", and so violated rules 7-105(C)(6), 1-102(A)(1), (5),
(6).22 Rule 8.4(d) of the ABA Model Rules, requiring a lawyer not to
engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, has also
been held to create a duty of respect between opposing counsel.35
245. Id., p. 01:338.
246. ABA Model Rules, supra, note 203, p. 01:101.
247. Malewich v. Zacharias, 482 A.2d 951 (N.J. Super.A.D. 1984); Van Iderstine Co. v. RGJ
Contracting Co., 480 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1973).
248. Van Iderstine, id., p. 459.
249. Id., p. 459.
250. ABA Model Code, supra, note 202, p. 01:338.
251. In re Crumpacker, 383 N.E.2d 36 (Ind. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979),
especially at pp. 48-9.
252. Id., pp. 48-9.
253. See text accompanying note 229, supra.
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(ii) Express non-discrimination provisions
There are significant advantages to express non-discrimination provisions.
One advantage is that discriminatory conduct is clearly identifiable. This
is especially important in cases where discriminatory conduct would
otherwise be considered unobjectionable. It is also easier for those who
are the objects of discriminatory behaviour to file complaints without
being stigmatized if they can show that the conduct is plainly prohibited.
Referring to a specific provision is preferable to being forced to make an
interpretive argument about a vague and general provision.2
4
There are American state ethics code provisions which expressly
impose a duty of non-discrimination on both lawyers and judges. At
present, the only analogous Canadian are to be found in Quebec and
Ontario. Although there is as yet no specific non-discrimination provision
in the ABA Model Code or Model Rules, the state non-discrimination
provisions are generally variations on ABA Model Code or Model Rules
provisions. Some non-discrimination provisions are variations on Rule
8.4 of the ABA Model Rules, although most states have adopted Rule 8.4
of the Model Rules without adding a duty of non-discrimination. Rule
8.4(d) of the Model Rules provides that "[i]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct which is prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice.. ."z The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted
Rules of Professional Conduct, effective November 15, 1988, including
a Rule 8.4(d) modelled on Rule 8.4(d) of the Model Rules but including
a duty of non-discrimination. Rule 8.4(d) provides that:
Itis professional misconduct for a lawyer to... (d) engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice, including but not limited to
harmful or discriminatory treatment of litigants,jurors, witnesses, lawyers,
and others, based on race, nationality or sex.
256
The Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct were recently amended to
add Rule 8.4(g) (which is absent from the ABA Model Rules). The
Minnesota Rule defines professional misconduct to include harassment:
"[it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: ... (g) harass a person on
the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability,
sexual preference or marital status in connection with a lawyer's
254. The need for specific professional conduct provisions prohibiting discriminatory conduct
has been accepted by writers in the field. See for example, K. Koustensis, supra, note 70, p.
167.
255. ABA Model Rules, supra, note 203, p. 01:174.
256. Natl. Rptr. on Legal Ethics n.1 1991, RI:RULES:1-100, p.99. Approved and adopted by
order of the Rhode Island Supreme Court on November 1, 1988. Id., pp. 1-2.
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professional activities." 25'7 The comment accompanying Rule 8.4 states
that a lawyer will be "professionally answerable" for discrimination or
harassment:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice
law.... However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication.
Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offences involving
"moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include criminal and
civil offences concerning some matters of personal morality, such as
adultery and discrimination or harassment on the basis of sex, race, creed,
religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual preference or marital
status that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. 5
A proposed revision to the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct
would define professional misconduct to include engaging in "conduct
involving discrimination because of race, color, religion, age, sex,
national origin, marital status, or handicap."'2 9 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals adopted amended Rules of Professional Conduct
effective January 1, 1991, which include Rule 9.1 (which is not present
in the ABAModel Rules). Rule 9.1 prohibits discrimination in employment
by lawyers, including discrimination because of an individual's "family
responsibility":
A lawyer shall not discriminate against any individual in conditions of
employment because of the individual's race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, age, marital status, sexual orientation, family responsibility or
physical handicap.260
The New York State Bar Association has amended its Code of
Professional Responsibility, which is based on the ABA Model Code, to
include aduty of non-discrimination. DR 1-102(A)(6) was amended, and
EC 1-7 was added. DR 1-102(A)(6) defines misconduct to include
unlawful discrimination in the practice of law:
257. Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4(g) (as amended September24,1991),
52 Minn.S.A. 1992 Supp.Pamph. 193, p. 265.
258. Id., p. 265. The comment accompanying Rule 8.4 of the ABA Model Rules does not
expressly or impliedly include harassment as a kind of illegal conduct reflecting adversely on
fitness to practice law:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law... However,
some kinds of offense carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was
drawn in terms of offences involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed
to include offences concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery or
comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law.
[my emphasis]
ABA Model Rules, supra, note 203, p. 01:174.
259. L.H. Schafran, supra, note 55, p. 78.
260. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 9.1, Natl. Rptr. on Legal Ethics n.5/6 1991,
DC:RULES:l-53, p. 52.
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A lawyer shall not... [u]nlawfully discriminate in the practice of law,
including in hiring, promoting, or otherwise determining conditions of
employment, on the basis of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex,
disability or marital status.26'
EC 1-7 directs lawyers to avoid bias and condescension: "[a] lawyer
should avoid bias and condescension toward, and treat with dignity and
respect, all parties, witnesses, lawyers, court employees, and other
persons involved in the legal process."2 62
The most comprehensive U.S. non-discrimination provision is
contained in proposed revisions to the Michigan Rules of Professional
Conduct. The revisions were ordered by the Michigan Supreme Court,
which directed:
That the State Bar of Michigan make recommendations to this Court with
regard to the proposals by the task forces [on race and gender bias] that the
Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct be
amended to specifically prohibit sexual harassment and invidious
discrimination.
263
The proposed new Rule 5.7, which awaits approval by the Michigan
Supreme Court states:
(a) A lawyer shall not engage in invidious discrimination on the basis of
gender, race, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation, or ethnic
origin, and shall prohibit staff and agents subject to the lawyer's
direction and control from doing so.
(b) A lawyer shall not hold membership in any organization which the
lawyer knows invidiously discriminates on the basis of gender, race,
religion, disability, age, sexual orientation or ethnic origin.
(c) A lawyer serving as an adjudicative officer shall prohibit invidious
discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, disability, age,
sexual orientation, or ethnic origin againstparties, witnesses, counsel,
or others on the part of lawyers in proceedings before the adjudicative
officer.26
In Canada, s. 57 of the Quebec Professional Code provides that "[n]o
professional may refuse to provide services to any person because of race,
colour, sex, age, religion, national extraction or social origin of such
261. New York State Bar Association, Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1-102(A)(6),
Natl. Rptr. on Legal Ethics n.4/5 1988, NY:CODE:1-172, p. 22.
262. Id., EC 1-7, p. 21.
263. Michigan Supreme Court, Administrative Order 1990-3 [entered June 12, 1990].
264. Michigan Rules ofProfessional Conduct, Rule 5.7. Rule 8.4, which deals with misconduct,
is also amended to include discrimination. Quoted in Bar Leader (Nov/Dec 1990), p. 4 . The
new rules had not been adopted as of April, 1992.
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person." '265 Section 43 of the same code provides that "[n]o corporation
[including the Barreau du Quebec] shall refuse to issue a permit or
specialist's certificate or to grant a special authorization for reasons of
race, colour, sex, religion, national extraction or social origin . ' 26 6 In
January of 1990, the Law Society of Upper Canada amended its
Professional ConductHandbook2 67 to include a duty of non-discrimination.
Rule 13 of the Professional Conduct Handbook, entitled "Responsibility
to the Profession Generally", provides that "The lawyer should assist in
maintaining the integrity of the profession and should participate in its
activities. 2 61 Paragraph 5 of the "Commentary" to Rule 13, entitled
"Non-Discrimination", imposes a duty of non-discrimination on lawyers:
5. The lawyer shall not discriminate on the grounds of race, ancestry,
place of origin, colour, ethic origin, citizenship, religion, creed, sex,
sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status, orhandicap in the
employment of other lawyers or articled students, or in dealings with
other members of the profession or any other persons. 69
Non-discrimination provisions applicable to judges are contained in
Canon 3B of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct
("ABA Judicial Code").270 Not only does the Canon contain provisions
requiring a judge to refrain from discrimination, but a judge is required
to ensure that lawyers appearing before her also refrain from discrimination:
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A
judge shall not, in the performance ofjudicial duties, by words or conduct
manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual
orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court
officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so.
(6) A judge shall require* lawyers in proceedings before the judge to
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation
or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This
265. Professional Code, R.S.Q. c. C-26, as amended by S.Q. 1988, c. 29.
266. Id.
267. Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook (adopted by the
Convocation of the Law Society of Upper Canada on January 30,1987), as amended to January
25, 1991.
268. Id, p. 61. The text of Rule 13 is identical to that of Chapter XV of the CBA Code, supra,
note 198, p. 67.
269. Id., p. 62.
270. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct (adopted August 1990), in ABAIBNA Lawyer's Manual
on Professional Conduct, supra, note 202, pp. 01:3001-3024, p. 01:3006.
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Section 3B(6) does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic
status, or other similar factors, are issues in the proceedings.27'
The previous version of the Judicial Code requiredjudges to observe high
standards of conduct so as to preserve the integrity and independence of
the judiciary, and to be dignified and courteous to lawyers.272Judges were
routinely disciplined under the previous Judicial Code for sexual
harassment, sexual misconduct and improper sexual advances. In one
case, a Minnesota District Court judge was publicly reprimanded and
suspended without pay for one year after making unwelcome sexual
advances to his court reporter.273 Judge Miera also said to a number of
female court employees, "Do you people eat bananas for the vitamins or
for the phallic symbol?" 274 In suspending the judge, the court emphasized
the high standard of personal and professional conduct to which judges
are bound:
We find public censure and a one-year suspension from office adequately
convey the importance of the ethical violation. It should be understood
from this sanction that we, and the citizens of this state, will not tolerate
imjroper sexual advances by judges bound to "the highest standard of
personal conduct.
275  I
In another case, a female lawyer successfully took legal action against a
judge after he told her in open court, "I will tell you what, little girl, you
271. ABA Judicial Code, id., pp. 01:3006-3007. The asterisk after "require" indicates that it
is a defined term. "Require" is defined as follows:
The rules prescribing that ajudge "require" certain conduct of others are, like all of the
rules in this Code, rules of reason. The use of the term "require" in that context means
ajudge is to exercise reasonable direction and control over the conduct of those persons
subject to the judge's direction and control.... (Id., p. 01:3003).
The Judicial Code contains the following commentary on Canon 3B(5):
Ajudge must perform judicial duties impartially and fairly. Ajudge who manifests bias
on any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the
judiciary into disrepute. Facial expressions and body language, in addition to oral
communication, can give to parties or lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media and
others an appearance ofjudicial bias. Ajudge must be alert to avoid behavior that may
be perceived as prejudicial. (Id., p. 01:3007)
272. American BarAssociation, ModelCode ofJudicialConduct (1972),Canons I and3(a)(3).
The 1972 Judicial Code was last amended in 1984. It was replaced by the current Code of
Judicial Conduct, which was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association in August 1990.
273. In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1988).
274. Id., p. 853.
275. Id., p. 859.
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lose. ' 276 In another case, the judge said to a buxom prosecutor, "My clerk
and I have a bet on whether you wear weights on your ankles to keep you
from tipping over. '277 It is likely thatjudges will continue to be disciplined
under the more specific provisions in the new ABA Judicial Code.
A provision to the same effect as the ABA Judicial Code is contained
in proposed changes to the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. The
proposed new rule provides:
A judge shall not engage in invidious discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender or ethnic origin and
shall prohibit.staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's
direction from doing so. Ajudge shall prohibit suchinvidious discrimination
against parties, witnesses, counsel or others on the part of lawyers in
proceedings before the judge.278
(iii) Proposed Canadian code provisions
If there is to be a professional duty of non-discrimination in Canada, the
American experience indicates that there are at least two ways of arriving
at such a duty. On the one hand, it would be possible to interpret general
duties that already exist in Canadian codes of professional responsibility
to include a duty of non-discrimination. The American experience
indicates that at least the duties to act with integrity, to uphold the
administration of justice, and to treat other lawyers with courtesy and
good faith are capable of such an interpretation. There are advantages to
such an approach. No changes to existing codes of professional
responsibility are required. Broadening the scope of the legal notions of
integrity, the administration ofjustice, and of courtesy and good faith will
have potentially beneficial effects throughout the legal system, by exporting
the concept of non-discrimination to other legal contexts. However, there
are also disadvantages. If the American case-law provides any indication,
then the duty of non-discrimination that will be read into these provisions
will be limited. Such a duty will likely be confined to a duty of
non-harassment. While this is important, harassment is far from the only
form of discrimination which exists in the legal profession.
The second possible approach is to draft specific provisions defining
a duty of non-discrimination for Canadian codes of professional
responsibility. There are disadvantages to this approach. Amending
existing codes of professional conduct will take time. The experience in
U.S.jurisdictions indicates that the impetus for such amendments generally
276. In re Jordan, N.Y.L.J. March 2, 1983 (State of N.Y. Commission on Judicial Conduct).
277. "Gender Bias Running Rampant", Litigation News, Summer 1987, p. 21.
278. Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, quoted in Bar Leader, supra, note 264.
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comes from studies of discrimination, and particularly gender
discrimination, in the legal system. Several Canadian jurisdictions have
already embarked on such studies, and it seems probable that pressure
from within the legal profession for specific non-discrimination provisions
will grow. There are also definite advantages to specific non-discrimination
provisions. The various forms of discrimination can be directly targeted
through clear drafting. Such provisions can be aimed at discrimination in
employment, as well as at the exclusion or deprecation of the perspectives
of the excluded.
It is likely that the approach that will develop in Canada will combine
the interpretation of existing general code provisions with the eventual
adoption of specific non-discrimination provisions. With the American
provisions in mind, I propose two possible non-discrimination provisions
for inclusion in Canadian codes of professional conduct. The first
provision is conservative:
A lawyer shall discharge all of his or her professional duties without
discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of gender, race,
religion, disability, age, sexual orientation or ethnic origin. A lawyer shall
also ensure that those under his or her direction and control carry out their
duties without discrimination.
It is also possible to envision a more ambitious non-discrimination
provision, such as the following:
The duty of non-discrimination
A. Definitions
The following terms are defined terms in this section:
(1). "Discrimination" means the making of a distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference on the basis of a stereotype to the detriment
of the dignity of any person.
(a) Any ground of distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
may be discriminatory.
(b) Examples of distinctions which may be discriminatory include
sex, race, sexual orientation, national or ethnic origin, colour,
handicap, nationality, income, and religion.
(2) A "stereotype" is a generalization about a class of persons that does
not further the dignity of that class of persons.
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(3) "Discrimination" includes harassment on discriminatory grounds.
(a) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, harassment on
the grounds of gender includes being described in familiar terms,
being subject to comments about personal appearance, being
subject to remarks and conduct that degrade women, as well as
being subject to verbal or physical advances.
(b) Harassment on grounds other than gender may also include the
specific examples listed in the previous section.
B. Statement of principle
The members of the legal profession are committed to the elimination of
discrimination in and by the profession, and to welcoming into the
profession groups and perspectives which may previously have been
excluded from the profession.
C. Duties of lawyers
It is the duty of the partners and associates of law firms:
(1) to develop a policy for the elimination of discrimination in the work
environment.
(a) The policy should be updated as needed.
(b) All members of the firm, including support staff, should be
consulted in the development and revision of the policy. Where
appropriate, members of the community should also be consulted.
(2) to develop a policy on parenting consistent with the duty not to
discriminate and with the principle that members of the firm should
be free to find fulfilment in their family lives while remaining, so far
as is possible, fully-participating members of the firm.
(a) Where possible, the policy should allow for flexible work
arrangements for both male and female members of the firm of
the firm.
(b) Where reasonably appropriate, the firm should arrange for daycare
for the children of both male and female members.
(c) The policy should be revised when appropriate. All members of
the firm, including support staff, should be consulted in the
development and revision of the policy. Where appropriate,
members of the community should also be consulted.
(d) Any policy should apply equally to support staff.
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(3) not to discriminate against or harass lawyers, judges, employees,
witnesses, jurors or other participants in the legal system.
D. Judicial conduct79
It is the duty of every judge:
(1) to perform his or her judicial duties without discrimination, whether
real or apparent, against parties, witnesses, counsel, jurors or any
other person.
(2) to require all those under his or her control, including lawyers, staff,
court officials and others, to refrain from discrimination, whetherreal
or apparent, against parties, witnesses, counsel, jurors, or any other
person.
(3) to inform himself or herself the perspectives and experiences of those
who may appear before him or her.
(a) Where possible, a judge should learn about these perspectives
and experiences in consultations with the appropriate groups or
communities.
(b) A judge should make every effort to understand and to value
perspectives which may be different from his or her own.
IV. Conclusion
The evidence of discrimination in the legal profession is overwhelming.
It is incumbent upon the legal profession to respond to the growing
evidence of discrimination with strategies to reduce and eventually
eliminate discrimination in the profession. An important aspect of any
such strategy will be a professional duty of non-discrimination. Such a
duty can be implemented both through the interpretation of provisions
that already exist in Canadian codes of professional conduct, and through
the adoption of specific non-discrimination provisions.
279. These provisions could be included in a Canadian Code of Judicial Conduct.
